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THE CONFLICT AND INTERACTION OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT WITH
THE OMNIBUS TRANSPORTATION EMPLOYEE
TESTING ACT: TWO MODEST PROPOSALS
TO ACHIEVE GREATER SYNCHRONY
INTRODUCTION
Conflicting societal goals are not uncommon. For instance, one
may support a woman's right to choose, but detest abortion. One may
value civil liberties, but demand aggressive police action to ensure safe
streets. Accordingly, our laws, too, must conflict, or at least fail to
intertwine with perfect synchrony.
By enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),' Congress
proclaimed that eliminating discrimination against the disabled was a
salient societal goal.2 Additionally, Congress recognized that people
suffering from alcoholism or drug addiction are also considered dis-
abled,3 and that reformed drug abusers are entitled to protection from
discrimination based on that disability.4 While the ADA has been de-
scribed as the "Emancipation Proclamation" for the disabled,5 the
Act's actual execution may render such statements hyperbole. 6
1. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 29, 42 & 47 U.S.C.). This Comment discusses only the em-
ployment provisions of the ADA, which are contained in Title I of the ADA. Therefore, this
Comment's references to the ADA are limited to Title I unless otherwise indicated.
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(8) (Supp. V 1993) (stating that the ADA's goals are to ensure
equal opportunities and full participation for disabled individuals); see also H.R. REP. No. 485,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 22 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304 (articulating
that "the purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate to end
discrimination against individuals with disabilities").
3. See S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1989) (including alcoholism and drug addic-
tion in a list of conditions, diseases and infections covered by the ADA, while stating that the list
does not include all covered disabilities).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,114(b) (stating that individuals who no longer use illegal drugs and have
been successfully rehabilitated may not be excluded from the ADA's protection).
5. Adam Z. Horvath, Disabled-Rights Bill Praised and Feared, NEWSDAY, Sept. 9, 1989, at 2.
6. For example, in 1914 labor leader Samuel Gomper described the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730
(1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994)), as "labor's charter of freedom." Gomper's
euphoria was short-lived, however, as soon thereafter judicial interpretation of the Clayton Act
in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), rendered moot the gains that the
Clayton Act intended to provide organized labor. ARC-HBALD COX, ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS, 39-51 (11th ed. 1991).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:537
However, the implementation of the ADA into the professional
arena may raise legitimate concerns for employers.7 First, many of the
ADA's key terms are ambiguous, and its requirements of fact-specific
determinations invite litigation. 8 Second, many employers fear the
ADA simply provides further protection to the malfeasants, malcon-
tents, and hypochondriacs in the workforce. 9 Third, the ADA makes
it more difficult to comply with other existing federal laws. For in-
stance, much has been written on the ADA's conflicts with the Em-
ployment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)10 and the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)."
Federally mandated alcohol and drug testing is an area of federal
law which has not received much attention regarding its association
with the ADA. A series of high profile transportation fatalities
caused by the abuse of alcohol or drugs1 2 prompted Congress to enact
7. See Thomas H. Barnard, The Americans With Disabilities Act: Nightmare for Employers
and Dream for Lawyers?, 64 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 229 (1990) (arguing that the Act's ambiguous
terms and unclear guidelines will force employers and employees to utilize the courts to resolve
even the most basic issues); Robin Andrews, Comment, The Americans With Disabilities Act of
1990: New Legislation Creates Expansive Rights for the Disabled and Uncertainties for Employ-
ers, 21 CUMB. L. REV. 629 (1990-91) (identifying the ADA's ambiguous provisions and anticipat-
ing repercussions to employers).
8. Barnard, supra note 7, at 252.
9. One commentator has argued that the types of disability discrimination complaints re-
ceived by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) support this notion. Ger-
ald D. Skoning, Litigious Society Tests Disability Law, CHi. TRIB., Dec. 6, 1994, § 1, at 23. For
instance, back injuries are the most frequently cited disability in EEOC complaints, accounting
for 20 percent of all claims. Id. Additionally, more than 24 percent of complaints assert some
form of emotional, psychiatric, or neurological impairment. Id.
10. See, e.g., Kathlynn L. Butler, Securing Employee Health Benefits Through ERISA and the
ADA, 42 EMORY L.J. 1197 (1993) (exploring how the ADA reinforces the eroding protection
afforded under ERISA); Lizette Palmer, ERISA Preemption and its Effect On Capping the
Health Benefits of Individuals With AIDS: A Demonstration of Why the United States Health and
Insurance System Requires Substantial Reform, 30 Hous. L. REV. 1347 (1994) (explaining how
the ADA and ERISA interact in the context of health care benefits for AIDS sufferers); Ted
Storer, The Americans With Disabilities Act: Will the Insurance Field Change?, 20 Omo N.U. L.
REV. 1031 (1994) (explaining the impact of the ADA and ERISA on the insurance industry).
11. See, e.g., Loren K. Allison & Eric H.J. Stahlhut, A Reasoned Approach to Harmonizing
the ADA and the NLRA, 43 LAB. L.J. 292 (1994) (advising employers to propose joint union-
employer ADA compliance agreements); Mary K. O'Melveny, The Americans with Disabilities
Act and Collective Bargaining Agreements: Reasonable Accommodation or Irreconcilable Con-
flicts, 82 Ky. L.J. 219 (1993-94) (arguing that these conflicts can be resolved through collective
bargaining); Rose Daly-Rooney, Note, Reconciling Conflicts Between the Americans With Disa-
bilities Act and the National Labor Relations Act to Accommodate People With Disabilities, 6
DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 389 (1994) (exploring the effects of collective bargaining agreements on the
employer's duty to provide reasonable accommodations).
12. See S. REP. No. 54, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-6 (1991) (recounting a multitude of tragic
incidents, such as the 1987 collision between an Amtrack passenger train and a Conrail freight
train killing 16 people and injuring 170, where the Conrail engineer and brakeman smoked mari-
juana in the train just prior to the accident).
INTERACTION OF ADA AND OTETA
the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991
(OTETA). 13 OTETA directed the Secretary of Transportation to im-
plement regulations requiring employers of transportation workers
performing safety-sensitive functions to establish alcohol and drug
testing programs for their employees. 14 Though employees affected
by OTETA run the gamut of transportation modes, by far the largest
class of covered employees are truck drivers,' 5 who are subject to the
Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) implementing
regulations.16
This Comment explores the conflicts and interactions between the
ADA and OTETA. Part I discusses the substantive provisions of the
ADA and OTETA. Section L.A examines the ADA, particularly the
ADA's coverage of alcoholism and drug addiction as protected disa-
bilities, as well as the ADA's restrictions on medical and disability-
related pre-employment inquiries.
Section I.B explains the substantive provisions of OTETA, empha-
sizing the FHWA's implementing regulations. Of particular impor-
tance is OTETA's mandate that employers make pre-hiring inquiries
of an applicant's previous employers and obtain the results of any pos-
itive OTETA-required alcohol or drug tests in the last two years. This
section also analyzes OTETA's scheme for allowing an employee who
has failed an alcohol or drug test to return to performing safety-sensi-
tive functions.
Part II discusses the perils employers face when attempting to com-
ply with both the ADA and OTETA. Section II.A discusses
OTETA's requirement that new employers obtain, and previous em-
ployers release, the results of an applicant's alcohol and drug tests ad-
ministered within the last two years, and how this conflicts with the
ADA's confidentiality requirements. To resolve this tension, Section
II.B proposes that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) treat alcohol tests administered to detect only the on-duty
use of alcohol in the same manner as drug tests administered solely to
detect illegal drug use, by holding that they are not subject to the
ADA's confidentiality requirements.
13. Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991 (OTETA), Pub. L. No. 102-143,
105 Stat. 952, 953 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 45 U.S.C. and 49 U.S.C.).
14. 49 U.S.C. app. § 2717(a) (Supp. V. 1993).
15. See S. REP. No. 54, supra note 12, at 15 (estimating that 538,000 air carrier employees,
31,816 FAA employees, 90,000 rail industry workers, and 5.5 million truck drivers will be cov-
ered by the legislation).
16. Controlled Substances & Alcohol Use and Testing, 49 C.F.R. § 382 (1994).
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Section II.C explores the question of whether, given the ADA's
protection of alcoholics and drug addicts, transportation employers
may exclude all applicants whose OTETA-required pre-employment
background check reveals a failed alcohol or drug test from further
consideration. The Section concludes that such a blanket policy is vul-
nerable to attack under a disparate impact theory of disability discrim-
ination. Two defenses are then scrutinized: 1) that the policy is not
discriminatory because these applicants pose a direct threat to the
safety of others; and 2) that the policy is not discriminatory because it
is justified by the business necessity of minimizing tort liability expo-
sure. However, the course charted by each defense leads to a com-
mon intersection, where the employer must show that hiring the
applicant creates a high probability of harm to others before refusing
employment to an ADA-protected applicant. This Section concludes
that requiring employers to establish a high probability of harm is con-
trary to sound public policy, because between the parameters "slightly
increased risk" and "high probability of harm," the potential for disas-
ter is very real, particularly in the transportation industry.
Finally, Section II.D argues that Congress should implement a mod-
est modification of the direct threat standard. This Comment pro-
poses a modification which would allow employers to deny
employment to persons who posed only an increased risk to safety, if
the increased risk was to others, and if the essential job functions re-
quired performance of safety-sensitive functions while in contact with
others. This standard would better serve the goal of a crash-free
transportation system while causing only a miniscule loss of protection
for the disabled.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Americans with Disabilities Act
The ADA is modeled largely after Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973,17 therefore, this Section first discusses the Rehabilitation
Act. After discussing the Rehabilitation Act, this Section considers
the substantive provisions of the ADA, with particular emphasis on
who is covered under the ADA and the protections afforded al-
coholics and drug addicts. Finally, this Section examines the theories
of discrimination under which an ADA claim may proceed, the
ADA's restrictions on medical and disability related inquiries, and the
ADA's confidentiality requirements.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994); H.R. REP No. 485, supra note 2, at 23, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 304; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 3, at 2.
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1. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The Rehabilitation Act prohibits entities receiving federal financial
assistance from discriminating against otherwise qualified "handi-
capped" individuals on the basis of their handicaps.18 An individual is
"otherwise qualified" under the Rehabilitation Act if the person can
perform the essential functions of the job with reasonable accommo-
dations. 19 A reasonable accommodation is reached with a change or
modification in the structure of a job which does not impose an undue
hardship on the employer.20 Determining whether a specific accom-
modation imposes an undue hardship requires an individualistic in-
quiry considering an employer's size, operating budget, and cost of the
accommodation. 21
The Rehabilitation Act fell short of its stated goal of fully integrat-
ing the disabled into the mainstream of American life.22 For instance,
in considering the need for stronger legislation, Congress cited a Louis
Harris poll finding that two-thirds of all disabled Americans were not
working, although sixty-six percent of the non-working group stated
they wanted to work.23
18. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
19. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987) (stating that determining whether a
disabled person is otherwise qualified requires an individualized inquiry); see also 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.3(k)(1) (1985) (implementing the Rehabilitation Act).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 794; see also 29 C.F.R. § 32.3 (1995) (defining reasonable accommodation in
the Department of Labor's regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act).
21. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c) (1994) (enumerating the factors to be considered in determining
whether an accommodation is reasonable under Department of Health and Human Services
regulations); see also Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.17 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c)(1994)) (listing the
factors to be considered in determining whether an accommodation would cause an undue hard-
ship); Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 308 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 1613.704(c) (1994)) (outlining the accommodation duty's contours).
22. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, at 29, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 313 (stating
that "current Federal and state laws are inadequate to address the discrimination faced by peo-
ple with disabilities"); S. REP. No. 116, supra note 3, at 18-19 (1989) (pointing out the failures of
the Rehabilitation Act in eliminating discrimination against the disabled); see also Bonnie P.
Tucker, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act After Ten Years of Enforcement- The Past and the
Future, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 845 (providing a comprehensive analysis of the Rehabilitation Act's
shortcomings).
23. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, at 32, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 314; S. REP. No.
116, supra note 3, at 9 (citing Louis HARRIS & Assocs., THm ICD SURVEY OF DISABLED AMER-
ICANS: BRINGING DISABLED AMERICANS INTO THE MAINSTREAM 50 (1987)).
Furthermore, the work situation for disabled Americans appears to be regressing. Congress
cited statistics showing that in 1980, men with disabilities earned 23 percent less than those with-
out a disability, and that by 1988 this dropped to 36 percent less than their non-disabled counter-
parts. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, at 32, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 314; S. REP.
No. 116, supra note 3, at 9 (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CUR-
RENT POPULATION REPORTS, Special Studies Series P-23, No. 160, Labor Force Status and Other
Characteristics of Persons with Work Disabilities: 1981-1988 5 (1989)). "The statistics consist-
ently demonstrate that disabled people are among the poorest, least educated and largest minor-
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Three factors have been identified to explain the Rehabilitation
Act's failure.24 First, the Act did not achieve full integration because
it applied only to those employers receiving federal financial assist-
ance. 25 Full integration would encompass prohibiting discrimination
across all sectors of the economy.26 Second, the Act lacked a unified
enforcement mechanism.27 Under the Rehabilitation Act, each fed-
eral agency was required to implement its own enforcement proce-
dures.28 Enforcing these regulations was a very low priority for many
agencies, leaving aggrieved parties with inadequate remedies.2 9 Third,
the ambiguous nature of critical terms such as "reasonable accommo-
dation" and "otherwise qualified" 30 often resulted in confusing and
conflicting judicial interpretations. 31 By enacting the ADA, Congress
at least took a significant step towards remedying the first two of these
deficiencies. 32
ity in America." H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, at 32-33, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 304
(quoting Statement of Vice President George Bush on Disabled Americans); S. REP. No. 116,
supra note 3, at 9.
24. See bcker, supra note 22, at 848-50 (stating that lack of enforcement by appropriate agen-
cies, ambiguous terms, and application to only federal financial assistance recipients are the
three major weaknesses of the Act).
25. Id. at 906.
26. Id. at 908-09; see also Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980)
(dismissing a claim under the Rehabilitation Act because the defendant did not receive federal
financial assistance).
27. See lcker, supra note 22, at 851 (finding that the dissemination of responsibility pre-
vented effective enforcement of Section 504).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
29. See Tucker, supra note 22, at 851-83 (citing examples where the Department of Educa-
tion's office of civil rights and the Department of Health and Human Services' office of civil
rights failed to enforce the regulations).
30. See id. at 884 (stating that the biggest problem facing "disabled people today who seek
protection under Section 504 is the lack of consistent standards" to be applied to each case).
31. Compare Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 414 (1979) (holding
that an applicant to a post-secondary education program must be otherwise qualified in spite of
her handicap) with Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985) (finding that in the context of
providing health services, reasonable accommodations must be made to assure meaningful
access).
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(5)(A)(stating that the ADA applies to all employers with 15 or
more employees). In addition, Congress designated the EEOC as the sole federal agency re-
sponsible for implementing and enforcing Title I of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,116 (directing
the EEOC to implement regulations not later than one year after the ADA's enactment); 42
U.S.C. § 12,117(b) (requiring that all agencies responsible for enforcement work together to
avoid duplication of efforts).
Unfortunately, the ambiguity of key terms remains and has been the focus of much commen-
tary. See Barnard, supra note 7, at 239 (arguing that the uncertainty of key terms will breed
litigation); Gregory S. Crespi, Efficiency Rejected: Evaluating "Undue Hardship" Claims Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 26 TULSA L.J. 1, 23-25 (1990) (asserting that the EEOC has
underestimated the ADA's cost to employers); George C. Dolatly, The Future of the Reasonable
Accommodation Duty in Employment Practices, 26 COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROBS. 523, 547-52
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2. Substantive Provisions of the ADA
The ADA prohibits certain entities from discriminating against
qualified individuals with disabilities because of their disability in job
application procedures, hiring, advancement, discharge, compensa-
tion, job training and other terms, conditions and privileges of em-
ployment.3 3 Covered entities include "employers, employment
agencies, labor organizations and joint labor-management commit-
tees." 34 Employers are those persons "engaged in an industry affect-
ing commerce who ha[ve] 15 or more employees for each working day
in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceeding
calendar year."35 The agents of such employers are also included. 36
a. Definition of Disability
For an applicant or employee to be protected under the ADA, he or
she must be a qualified individual with a disability.37 A disability is a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits a person in
one or more major life activities.38 Establishing disability involves sat-
isfying a two pronged test: 1) there must be a physical or mental im-
pairment, and 2) it must substantially limit the person in one or more
major life activities.39 The ADA adopts the definition of physical or
mental impairment40 from the Rehabilitation Act's implementing reg-
ulations.41 This definition does not include physical characteristics, 42
(1993) (advocating a quantitative method of determining when an accommodation is an undue
burden); Andrews, supra note 7, at 635-39 (outlining the uncertainty employers face with the
ADA).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(a).
34. Id. § 12,111(2).
35. Id. § 12,111(5)(A).
36. Id. However, supervisors who do not independently satisfy the ADA's definition of "em-
ployer" cannot be held liable under the ADA. EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, 55 F.3d
1276, 1281-82 (7th Cir. 1995).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112.
38. Id. § 12,102(2).
39. Id
40. The EEOC's regulations implementing the ADA define a physical or mental impairment
as:
(1) [a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskele-
tal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, repro-
ductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic or lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or (2) [a]ny
mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome,
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1995).
41. See Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R.
app. § 1630.2(g) (1995) (defining "disability"); see also H.R. REP No. 485, supra note 2, at 50,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 332 (stating that the term "disability" in the ADA is similar to
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such as right or left handedness,4 3 body weight that is not the result of
a physiological disorder,44 or personality traits such as poor judgment
and bad temper.45
To be disabled under the ADA, the impairment must also substan-
tially limit the person in one or more major life activities. 46 Not all
impairments meet this criteria, and a certain impairment may rise to
this level for some people, but not others.4 7 Major life activities are
the normal day to day functions that most people perform with little
or no difficulty, including walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breath-
ing, learning, and working.4 8 Such activities are considered substan-
tially limited if the person is either unable to perform them or is
significantly restricted in the manner or duration in which the activity
can be performed.4 9 If medication is required to perform these major
life activities, or required medication interferes with the performance
of such activities, the person's condition still qualifies as a disability.50
the term "handicap" in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); S. REP. No. 116, supra note 3, at 21
(stating that Congress intended to adopt the Rehabilitation Act's definition of "individuals with
handicaps" and its relevant case law as the ADA's definition of disability).
42. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h). See Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1245
(6th Cir. 1985) (holding that a mild case of "cross-eyes" was not a qualifying impairment under
the Rehabilitation Act).
43. 29 C.F.R app. § 1630.2(h).
44. Id.; see Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (upholding the
dismissal of a flight attendant due to bodybuilder's bulk). But see Cook v. Rhode Island Dep't of
Mental Health, Retardation & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17,24 (1st Cir. 1993) (explaining that obesity may
be a covered disability and that the "voluntariness" of the condition is relevant only in determin-
ing whether it has a substantial limiting effect).
45. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h); see also Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1989) (sus-
taining the rejection of a police officer due to poor judgment and irresponsibility). But see Hind-
man v. GTE Data Servs., No. 93-1046-CIV-T-17C, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9552, at *11 (M.D.
Fla. June 24, 1994) (holding that plaintiff's chemical imbalance raised a triable issue of fact in
answering whether his poor judgment in carrying a gun to work was caused by his disability
under the ADA).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2).
47. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (explaining that determining whether someone has a disabil-
ity does not depend upon the name or diagnosis given the impairment, but rather upon the effect
the impairment has on the person's life).
48. See id. § 1630.2(i) (indicating that this list is not exhaustive); see also School Bd. v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273, 280 (1987) (breathing); Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 942 (10th Cir. 1994)
(manual tasks); Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1390 (5th Cir. 1993) (seeing); and Panda-
zides v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 946 F.2d 345, 350 (4th Cir. 1991) (learning).
49. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j).
50. Id.; see Chandler, 2 F.3d at 1391 (finding that insulin-dependent diabetics are disabled
under the Rehabilitation Act since they are unable to function without medication); Sarsycki v.
United Parcel Serv., 862 F. Supp. 336, 340 (W.D. Okla. 1994) (holding, consistent with Chandler,
that insulin-dependent diabetics are disabled under the ADA); see also Fehr v. McLean Packag-
ing Corp., 860 F. Supp. 198, 200 (E.D.Pa. 1994) (concluding that evidence that medication taken
for depression which had the side effect of hindering plaintiff's breathing in confined spaces was
sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA).
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Therefore, persons suffering from conditions such as epilepsy or dia-
betes may be disabled even though medication provides for perform-
ance of all major life activities.5' Additional considerations include
the nature and severity of the impairment, the duration or expected
duration of the condition, and the impairment's permanent or long-
term impact.5 2
Further issues arise if the person claims to be substantially limited
in working. The inability to perform one particular job does not sub-
stantially limit this major life activity.53 The analysis requires addi-
tional considerations, such as the geographical area the individual has
access to, the types of similar jobs the individual is excluded from, and
the types of other jobs the person may or may not be able to per-
form.54 Therefore, individuals may not be substantially limited in
working unless they are excluded from a broad class of jobs or there
are no other jobs in the same geographical area in which the person
may perform.55
To receive ADA protection, it is not necessary that a person be dis-
abled at the time of the discriminatory act. 56 The ADA also protects
those who have a record of disability but are no longer disabled, or
perhaps were never disabled.57 This theory of disability is potentially
problematic. For instance, a record reflecting a percentage of loss in
the use of certain body limbs has been held insufficient in itself to
establish a protected disability.58
In Flasza v. TNT Holland Motor Express,59 the court held that there
were no disputed issues of fact as to whether ADA protection should
be granted to an employee discharged after an investigation revealed
51. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.26).
52. Id.
53. Id. § 1630.20)(3); see Cook v. Rhode Island Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation &
Hosp., 10 F.3d 17,26 (1st Cir. 1993) (ruling that when proceeding under a theory of "regarded as
having" a disability, the plaintiff must only show that the employer regarded the plaintiff being
unable to perform a broad class of jobs); Chandler, 2 F.3d at 1393 (refusing to hold that an
insulin-dependant diabetic who was physically unqualified for a driver position but able to per-
form a wide variety of other jobs was substantially limited in the major life activity of working);
see also Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 944 (10th Cir. 1994) (upholding the lower court's
summary judgment order where the plaintiff submitted no evidence showing he was excluded
from a broad class of jobs).
54. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20); see also Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1419 (10th Cir.
1992) (setting forth the test to determine whether the plaintiff is substantially limited in working
under the Rehabilitation Act).
55. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(B)-(C).
57. Id § 12,102(2)(B).
58. Flasza v. TNT Holland Motor Express, 159 F.R.D. 672, 677-78 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
59. 159 F.R.D. 672 (N.D. IIl. 1994).
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five separate workers compensation claims with other employers.6°
The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, rea-
soning that although the employer's investigation revealed a record of
impairments, there was nothing in the record indicating that the im-
pairments substantially limited the plaintiff in one or more major life
activities. 61 Therefore, the disability prong was satisfied, but the sec-
ond prong requiring that the impairments must substantially limit at
least one major life activity was not met.62
The ADA also protects persons erroneously regarded as being dis-
abled.63 Establishing ADA protection under this theory of disability
does not require a showing that the plaintiff was ever impaired or dis-
abled.6 Rather, the plaintiff must only show that the employer re-
garded the plaintiff as being substantially limited in one or more life
activities. 65
In sum, ADA protection may be granted where the person is either:
1) currently disabled; 2) no longer disabled but has a record of being
disabled; or 3) perceived to be disabled, and both prongs of the disa-
bility definition are met. However, protection of an individual in one
of these groups also depends on whether that individual is "otherwise
qualified."
b. Otherwise Qualified
Even if a person has a disability under the ADA, they are not pro-
tected unless they are also "otherwise qualified. ' 66 Determining
whether a person is qualified is a fact-specific, individual inquiry in-
60. Id. at 678.
61. id.
62. Id.
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,202(2)(C) (stating that the term "disability" with respect to an individ-
ual means being regarded as having such an impairment).
64. See Cook v. Rhode Island Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation and Hosps., 10 F.3d 17,28
(1st Cir. 1993) (finding that a "morbidly obese" but physically capable applicant was protected
under the Rehabilitation Act based on the employer's perceptions of her abilities).
65. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(3); see also id. app. § 1630.2(g) (explaining that an individual who is
regarded by the covered entity as having an impairment is considered to have a "disability").
One difficulty with this theory is establishing the employer's subjective beliefs towards the em-
ployee. Occasionally though, employers are surprisingly candid. For instance, in Cook, a case
brought under the Rehabilitation Act, a "morbidly obese" but physically capable applicant was
deemed to be protected under the Rehabilitation Act after being denied employment as a
mental health worker. Cook, 10 F.3d at 28. The court held that the employer's statements re-
garding how he viewed the plaintiff's physical capabilities was sufficient evidence for the jury to
conclude that, despite the applicant not being disabled, the employer, based on prejudicial feel-
ings towards the obese, erroneously regarded her as disabled. Id. at 25.
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(a) (prohibiting discrimination against a qualified individual with a
disability).
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volving two steps.67 First, the person must satisfy the job position's
objective criteria, such as appropriate educational background, pos-
session of required licenses or prerequisite job experience. 68 Second,
the person must be capable of performing the essential functions of
the job, either with or without reasonable accommodations. 69
A job function may be essential for any number of reasons, includ-
ing, the three considerations listed in the EEOC's implementing regu-
lations.70 The first consideration is whether the position exists to
perform that function.71 For instance, the position of a business col-
lege instructor exists to perform the function of teaching class. There-
fore, in Tyndall v. National Education Centers,72 an employee
suffering from lupus erythematous, an ailment requiring frequent ab-
sences from work, was not otherwise qualified for the position, since
being present to teach her classes was an essential function of the
job.73 Further, a reasonable accommodation was not available, since
she could not teach class if she was not present.74
A second consideration is the number of other employees available
to perform the function and among which employees the performance
67. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); see School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987) (interpreting the
Rehabilitation Act and finding that the "otherwise qualified" issue requires the district court to
make an individualized inquiry).
68. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(8). The ADA defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as an
"individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." Id.; see
'Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209, 214 (4th Cir. 1994) (denying ADA protection to a
teacher whose disability prevented her from performing the essential function of being present
in the classroom and where no reasonable accommodation was possible); see also Reigel v. Kai-
ser Foundation Health Plan, 859 F. Supp. 963, 976 (E.D.N.C..1994) (refusing to grant ADA
protection to a physician whose limited use of her right arm and shoulder prevented her from
performing patient examinations).
70. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). This section states that
evidence of whether a particular job function is essential includes, but is not limited to
i) The employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; ii) Written job descrip-
tions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; iii) The amount
of time spent on the job performing the function; iv) The consequences of not requiring
the incumbent to perform the function; v) The terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment; vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or; vii) The current
work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.
d.; see also id. § 1630.2(n) (explaining the mechanics of inquiring into whether a particular job
function is essential).
71. Id. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i).
72. 31 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1994).
73. Id. at 213.
74. Id. at 214.
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of that function can be distributed.75 However, in Jasany v. United
States Postal Service,76 the Sixth Circuit held that the employer was
not required to have other employees perform essential job functions
the plaintiff was not capable of performing.77 The plaintiff's "cross-
eyes" made it impossible for him to operate the mail sorting machine
he was hired to operate. 78 Even though the plaintiff was required to
operate the machine for only a small portion of the day, and other
trained employees were available, the court held that since he was
hired to operate the machine, it was an essential function of the posi-
tion, regardless of the availability of others to perform it.79
The third consideration is the degree of expertise or skill required
for the function.80 The higher the degree of expertise or skill re-
quired, the more likely that function will be characterized as essen-
tial.8l Other important factors include the time spent performing the
function and the consequences if the function is not performed.8 2 For
example, a firefighter's essential job function includes carrying people
from burning buildings. Although a firefighter seldom, if ever, per-
forms the function, it is essential since the consequences are grave if
not performed.8 3
When ascertaining whether essential functions can be performed,
some courts consider the employee's own subjective assessment of his
abilities.84 For instance, in Reigel v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan,8 5
the plaintiff certified that she was unable to perform the essential
functions of her job on application forms and other items relating to
disability insurance and social security benefits.8 6 The court held
75. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(ii); see Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473, 478 (11th Cir. 1983)
(finding that an accommodation in the form of assigning additional workers from a limited staff
to perform the plaintiff's duties was an undue burden).
76. 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985).
77. Id. at 1250.
78. Id. at 1247.
79. Id. at 1251.
80. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(iii).
81. Id. § 1630.2(n).
82. Id. § 1630.2(n)(3); app. § 1630.2(n).
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., August v. Offices Unlimited, 981 F.2d 576, 580-82 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding such
language to be a binding admission); Reigel v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 859 F. Supp. 963
(E.D.N.C. 1994) (holding that the plaintiff's own submissions and certifications as to her disabil-
ity precluded her from demonstrating that she was qualified to perform functions of the job).
85. 859 F. Supp. 963 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
86. Id. at 967-69.
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these statements to be binding admissions by the plaintiff that she was
not otherwise qualified.87
The determination whether certain job functions are essential does
not, in any way, prohibit an employer from establishing standards,
tests, and other selection criteria which are based on job relatedness
and business necessity.88 The ADA is intended to give deference to
the employer's judgment as to what standards are required for a cer-
tain position.8 9 For example, if an employer feels its typists should be
able to type 75 words per minute, it is not required to hire an individ-
ual with a disability who can only type 65 words per minute. 90 How-
ever, if the individual is otherwise qualified and could type 75 words
per minute with a reasonable accommodation, that accommodation
must be provided.91
c. Direct Threat
Aside from establishing performance standards, employers may es-
tablish neutral criteria designed to mitigate safety concerns. Nonethe-
less, these criteria must be job related and required by business
necessity.92 Congress recognized, however, that safety concerns are
often based on paternalistic and stereotypic notions of the disabled,
have no basis in reality, and are used to justify discrimination.93
Therefore, safety-related concerns are viewed as job related or man-
dated by business necessity only if there is a direct threat to the safety
of the individual or others.94
87. Id. at 969-70; see also August, 981 F.2d at 580-82 (finding that statements made for the
purpose of obtaining disability benefits were binding admissions in a subsequent claim under the
ADA).
88. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.10; see id. app. § 1630.2(n) (emphasizing that such standards must exist in
fact, and not simply on paper); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(8) (providing that consideration shall
be given to the employer's judgment as to what job functions are essential).
89. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(n). See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, at 55, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 337 (reaffirming that the ADA does not undermine an employer's ability to
choose and maintain qualified workers); see also S. REP. No. 116, supra note 3 at 26 (stating that
employers are permitted under the ADA to select the most qualified applicant and make deci-
sions based on reasons unrelated to the existence of a disability).
90. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(n).
91. Id.
92. Id. app. § 1630.15(b) & (c).
93. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, at 56, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 338; S. REP. No.
116, supra note 3, at 39-40.
94. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(b), (c). "The term direct threat means a significant risk to the
health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12,111(3). But see Bryan P. Neal, The Proper Standard for Risk of Future Injury Under the
Americans With Disabilities Act Risk to Self or Risk to Others, 46 SMU L. REV. 483, 485-488
(1992) (arguing that Congress intended to eliminate all paternalistic concern towards the dis-
1996]
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A direct threat exists only if an individualistic inquiry reveals objec-
tive, factual evidence that the individual poses a substantial risk of
harm to him or herself or others. 95 Courts differ in their approach to
this mandate. For instance, in Davis v. Meese,96 a case arising under
the Rehabilitation Act, the court upheld the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation's exclusion of all insulin-dependent diabetics from special
agent positions. 97 The court stated that although blanket exclusions
were generally unacceptable under the Rehabilitation Act, legitimate
physical requirements were proper if they were directly connected
with and substantially promoted legitimate safety and job perform-
ance concerns. 98
A more recent decision upholding blanket exclusion of all insulin-
dependent diabetics is Chandler v. City of Dallas.99 In Chandler, the
Fifth Circuit upheld the city of Dallas's blanket exclusion of all insu-
lin-dependent diabetics from primary driving positions.1°° The city's
policy was modeled after the FHWA's physical requirements for com-
mercial motor vehicle operators.101 Although the city was not subject
to these regulations, the Fifth Circuit held that as a matter of law,
drivers with insulin-dependent diabetes present substantial risks to the
safety of themselves and others, and are therefore not otherwise quali-
fied. 10 2 Chandler is particularly important because, although the claim
was brought under the Rehabilitation Act, the court looked to the
ADA and its implementing regulations in reaching its decision.103
Other decisions have reached different conclusions. In Sarsycki v.
United Parcel Service,'04 the court looked to the same FHWA regula-
tions as the Chandler court and found that as long as the FHWA regu-
lations did not apply to a specific insulin-dependent driver, the ADA
required an individualistic inquiry. 105 The employer in Sarsycki at-
abled by making available only the "risk to others" standard, and that the EEOC exceeded its
authority by also making available a "risk to self" standard in its implementing regulations).
95. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). This assessment must be based on a reasonable medical judgment
relying on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence. Id.
In determining whether an individual could pose a direct threat, the factors to be considered
include (1) The duration of the risk; (2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) The
likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) The imminence of the potential harm. Id.
96. 692 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 865 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1989).
97. Id. at 518.
98. Id. at 517-18.
99. 2 F.3d 1385 (5th Cir. 1993).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1388.
102. Id. at 1395.
103. Id. at 1391.
104. 862 F. Supp. 336 (W.D. Okla. 1994).
105. Id. at 340-41.
[Vol. 45:537
INTERACTION OF ADA AND OTETA
tempted to apply the FHWA regulation prohibiting insulin-dependent
diabetics from operating commercial motor vehicles with Gross Vehi-
cle Weight Ratings106 in excess of 10,000 pounds to its drivers operat-
ing vehicles under 10,000 pounds.10 7 The plaintiff was employed as a
package car driver requiring only the operation of vehicles under
10,000 pounds, which are not subject to the FHWA's medical stan-
dards.108 After the plaintiff's diabetic condition deteriorated to where
he was insulin-dependent, the employer removed him from driving
duties and assigned him to a part-time non-driving position. 109 In re-
sponse to the plaintiff's ADA claim, the employer argued that the
policy was required by federal law, and to the extent it exceeded fed-
eral law, the extension was justified by the same underlying safety
concerns. 1 0 The court rejected this argument, holding that since the
federal safety regulations did not apply to the employee, exclusion
without an individual assessment of the potential safety threat vio-
lated the ADA."' The court distinguished Chandler by remarking
that since the Fifth Circuit's decision, the FHWA has at least provi-
sionally modified its position on the safety threat of insulin-dependent
diabetic drivers by establishing a waiver program. 1 2
Another case finding that blanket exclusion of insulin-dependent
diabetics violates the ADA is Bombrys v. City of Toledo.Ix3 In that
case, the Toledo police department dismissed Bombrys from its train-
ing academy after he was diagnosed as a diabetic. 114 Bombrys sought
106. The Gross Vehicle Weight Rating is set by the manufacturer and indicates the maximum
load the vehicle is designed to carry. 49 C.F.R. § 390 (1994).
107. Sarsycki, 862 F. Supp. at 340-41.
108. Id. at 338.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 339-40.
111. Id. at 341.
112. Id. The court may have overstated the significance of the FHWA's insulin-dependant
diabetic waiver program and its evidence of a change in the FHWA's position regarding insulin-
dependant drivers. The impetus of the waiver program was the ADA's directive that the De-
partment of Transportation conduct a review of its current medical qualification standards. S.
REP. No. 116, supra note 3, at 27-28. The Department of Transportation accepted waiver appli-
cations from July 29, 1993 to April 30, 1994 so that the waiver group could be compared with a
control group in terms of accident frequency and other safety considerations. Qualification of
Drivers, Waivers, Diabetes 58 Fed. Reg. 40,690 (1993). Eligibility was limited to insulin-depen-
dant diabetic drivers not subject to the federal prohibition who had been operating commercial
motor vehicles, while insulin dependant, for three years without incident. Id. at 40,691. Partici-
pation in the program required, among other things, blood glucose monitoring every four hours,
the keeping of a blood glucose log, and biannual examinations by an endocrinologist. Id. There
has not been any extension of the waiver program and waivers are no longer being issued to
insulin-dependant diabetics.
113. 849 F. Supp. 1210 (N.D. Ohio 1993).
114. Id. at 1213.
19961
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injunctive relief, arguing that the city's blanket policy of excluding all
diabetics violated the ADA by failing to provide for an individualistic
assessment of the safety threat posed. 115 The court agreed, stating
that Davis v. Meese was an interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act,
not the ADA, and that the ADA "makes clear that blanket exclusions
are to be given the utmost scrutiny, and are, as a general rule, to be
discouraged."116
Dismissal resulting from a single serious safety incident satisfies the
individualistic inquiry component of the direct threat standard. For
instance, in Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights,11 7 an insulin-de-
pendent diabetic police officer was dismissed after a hypoglycemic ep-
isode caused him to drive his patrol car uncontrollably at high rates of
speed. 18 The plaintiff argued that since his diabetes is currently
under better control, the employer is required to accommodate him
by providing a second chance. 19 The court disagreed, and instead
held that one incident was sufficient to conclude that the plaintiff
posed a direct threat, and was therefore not qualified. 20
Finally, if a reasonable accommodation eliminates the substantial
risk, the employer must make the accommodation.' 2' For instance, in
Strathie v. Department of Transportation,22 the plaintiff was denied a
school bus driver's license because he could not meet the hearing stan-
dard without a hearing aid. 123 Though the defendant cited safety con-
cerns as the reason for the requirement, the Third Circuit found that
allowing the plaintiff to wear a hearing aid sufficiently mitigated any
legitimate safety concerns and was therefore a reasonable accommo-
dation.' 24 As such, the state was required to accommodate Strathie by
allowing him to wear a hearing aid to meet the hearing standard.1 25
In Schmidt v. Safeway, Inc. ,126 the United States District Court for
the District of Oregon addressed the issue of whether an alcoholic
115. Id. at 1216-17.
116. Id. at 1219-20.
117. No. 94-C-2404, 1994 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 13015 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 1994), aff'd, 65 F.3d 664
(7th Cir. 1995).
118. Id. at *1.
119. Id. at *3-4.
120. Id. at *7.
121. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (stating that meeting the direct threat standard requires that
there be a substantial risk of harm which cannot be eliminated or reduced by making a reason-
able accommodation); see also id. app. § 1630.2(r) (stating that the employer must determine
whether a reasonable accommodation will reduce the threat to an acceptable level).
122. 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983).
123. Id. at 228-29
124. Id. at 232-34.
125. Id.
126. 864 F. Supp. 991 (D. Or. 1994).
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truck driver posed a direct threat.127 The court denied the employer's
motion for summary judgment, which argued, inter alia, that its firing
of an alcoholic truck driver did not violate the ADA, because the
driver's condition posed a direct threat to the safety of others.128 The
plaintiff was ordered to submit to a urinalysis after supervisors sus-
pected he was drunk while on duty, and was fired when the urinalysis
confirmed the presence of alcohol.129 Thereafter, the employer's
medical review officer opined that the plaintiff would be able to safely
operate the truck after completing a rehabilitation program. 30 The
court held that the medical review officer's finding was determinative
as to the direct threat issue, and that providing a leave of absence to
allow the employee to complete rehabilitation was a reasonable ac-
commodation required by the ADA. 131
d. Reasonable Accommodation
An accommodation is reasonable so long as it does not impose an
undue hardship on the employer. The ADA sets forth specific factors
to be considered when determining whether an accommodation is an
undue hardship.132 However, like other ADA issues, determining the
undue hardship issue requires a highly fact-specific inquiry.133 Em-
ployers are concerned about the overly optimistic view of Congress
and the EEOC regarding the accommodations available to employ-
ers.' 34 For instance, the legislative history speaks glowingly of em-
ployers providing readers for the blind, sign language interpreters for
127. Id.
128. Id. at 998-99.
129. Id. at 998.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 998-99.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(10)(B). The following factors should be considered in determining
whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on a covered entity:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed ... ; (ii) the overall financial
resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable accom-
modation; the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and
resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the
facility; (iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the
business of the covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number,
type, and location of its facilities; and (iv) the type of operation or operations of the
covered entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of
such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the
facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.
Id.
133. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p) (indicating that the term "undue hardship" considers sev-
eral factors, including the cost, extent and disruption caused by the accommodation).
134. Horvath, supra note 5, at 2.
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the deaf, job restructuring, redelegation of assignments, and other
"perfect world" accommodations. 135
Courts interpreting the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA have been
fairly sensitive to employers' concerns and have repeatedly refused to
impose accommodations upon the slightest indication they would be
unduly costly, substantial, disruptive, or fundamentally alter the na-
ture or operation of the business. For instance, despite the examples
in the legislative history and regulatory guidance, courts have gener-
ally recognized that employers are under no obligation to reassign em-
ployees who become disabled in the course of their employment. 36
Similarly, employers are not required, as was held in Jasany, to assign
other employees to assist with essential functions. 137 Therefore, the
employer in Reigel did not violate the ADA by refusing to assign cleri-
cal duties to a physician whose disability rendered her unable to per-
form the essential function of examining patients.1 38 Further, the
employer was not required, as requested by the plaintiff, to assign a
physician's assistant to assist with patient examinations. 39 Finally, in
Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Department,140 the Third Circuit held
that a police department was not required to accommodate known
drug users.' 41 The court reasoned that accommodating illegal drug
abuse fundamentally altered the nature and operation of a police de-
partment, which was to enforce the law.'4 2
135. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 3, at 31-35 (citing job restructuring, redelegating assign-
ments, part-time and modified work schedules, readers for the visually impaired and interpreters
for the deaf as examples of reasonable accommodations).
136. See, e.g., Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that the employer was
not obligated to reassign plaintiff to "light" duty); Simon v. Saint Louis County, 735 F.2d 1082,
1084-85 (8th Cir. 1984) (refusing to reinstate a paraplegic police officer despite evidence that
there were many police officer functions not requiring physical ability); Reigel v. Kaiser Founda-
tion Health Plan, 859 F. Supp. 963, 973 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (finding a health care organization was
not compelled to reassign disabled physician to clerical duties).
137. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637, 644 (2d Cir. 1991) (refusing to impose a duty on
the employer to assign other workers to do the heavy lifting plaintiff's disability prevented);
Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1250 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that the post
office was under no obligation to require other employees to perform the essential functions of
the plaintiff's position); Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473, 478 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding the
employer did not have to make such an excessive accommodation as to assign additional person-
nel from a limited staff to cover the plaintiff's duties); Reigel, 859 F. Supp. at 973 (concluding
that a medical group was not required to assign a physician's assistant to perform portions of
medical examinations the plaintiff was unable to perform).
138. Riegel, 859 F. Supp. at 973.
139. Id.
140. 840 F.2d 1139 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989).
141. Id. at 1149.
142. Id.
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A recent decision from the Seventh Circuit adopts an even more
restrictive interpretation of "reasonable accommodation." In Vande
Zande v. Wisconsin Department of Administration,143 the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that an accommodation could be unreasonable even though
it did not impose an undue hardship on the employer. 144 That court
found that an accommodation is unreasonable, and therefore not re-
quired under the ADA, if the cost of the accommodation is dispropor-
tionate to the benefit the disabled worker receives from the
accommodation. 145 Undue hardship, the Seventh Circuit stated, is a
separate analysis and merely provides a safe harbor for employers
who, because of financial hardship, cannot provide an accommodation
which is otherwise reasonable. 46 To conclude otherwise, the Seventh
Circuit reasoned, places employers with vast assets in the position of
never being able to prove undue hardship.1 47 In summary, the ADA
provides protection to those who fit into the above-discussed defini-
tions of "disabled" and "otherwise qualified." This Comment will
next discuss how alcoholism and drug addiction fit into this paradigm.
3. Alcoholism and Drug Addiction as Disabilities under the ADA
The propriety of treating alcoholism and drug addiction as pro-
tected disabilities under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA is quite
controversial1 48 Much of the dispute arises from the belief that alco-
holism and drug addiction are self-inflicted.' 49 However, research in-
dicates that genetic predispositions and other factors place the
etiology of addiction beyond the control of the afflicted.' 50 Current
public policy often reflects the latter view and treats alcoholism and
143. 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 543.
146. Id. at 542-43.
147. Id.
148. See Reese J. Henderson, Jr., Special Project, Addiction As Disability: Protection of Al-
coholics and Drug Addicts Under the Americans With Disabilities Act of1990, 44 VAND. L. REV.
713 (1991) (discussing the Rehabilitation Act's and the ADA's coverage of alcoholism and drug
addiction as protected disabilities); see also Marjorie S. Bertman, Comment, Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Protection Against Employment Discrimination for Alcoholics and
Drug Addicts, 28 AM. U. L. REV. 507 (1979) (examining the impact of the inclusion of addicts as
"handicapped" and thus within the scope of the Rehabilitation Act).
149. See, e.g., 1 NATIONAL INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., EXTENT AND ADEOUACY OF INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES
28 (1992) (acknowledging the pervasive public attitude towards drug abusers that their affliction
results from moral deficiency and a lack of self control).
150. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Kendler et al., A Population Based Twin Study of Alcoholism, 286
JAMA 1877 (1992) (exploring the link between genetics and a predisposition towards
alcoholism).
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drug addiction as "illnesses" requiring "treatment" rather than per-
sonality defects indicative of societal deviance. 151
The Rehabilitation Act as originally drafted was silent on whether
alcoholism and drug addiction were protected disabilities. 152 How-
ever, while drafting the Rehabilitation Act's implementing regula-
tions, the Department of Health and Human Services solicited an
opinion from the Attorney General regarding the issue.153 The Attor-
ney General opined that alcoholism and drug addiction were pro-
tected disabilities under the Rehabilitation Act.1 54 The judiciary,
following the Attorney General's lead, reached similar conclusions. 155
Although court decisions emphasized that employers may make em-
ployment decisions based on performance criteria apart from an em-
ployee's addiction, 56 employers became very concerned that they
were limited in what actions they could take against alcoholics or drug
addicts who, by reason of their addictions, were not performing to
standards or had other behavioral problems. 57
In response to the concerns of many employers, Congress amended
the Rehabilitation Act in 1978.158 The purpose of the amendment was
151. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, at 80, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 363 (en-
couraging employers to offer rehabilitation to alcoholics and drug addicts); see also 49 U.S.C.
app. § 1434(c) (finding that rehabilitation is a critical component of any testing program for
abuse of alcohol or use of illegal drugs and that it should be made available to individuals as
appropriate).
152. 29 U.S.C. § 794; Henderson, supra note 148, at 727.
153. Henderson, supra note 148, at 727.
154. 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 12 (April 12, 1977).
155. See Whitaker v. Board of Higher Educ., 461 F. Supp. 99, 106 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding
that the Rehabilitation Act protects alcoholics and drug addicts); see also Davis v. Bucher, 451 F.
Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (holding that exclusion of all job applicants with a history of drug
abuse violated the Rehabilitation Act).
156. See, e.g., Flynn v. Raytheon Co., 868 F. Supp. 383, 387-88 (D. Mass. 1994) (finding that
although the ADA protects one's status as an alcoholic, an employer may terminate an alcoholic
for violating related company policies, such one prohibiting on-duty alcohol use); Davis, 451 F.
Supp. at 797 n.4 (emphasizing that the Rehabilitation Act protects alcoholics and drug addicts
from discrimination based solely on their disability, and not job-related performance factors).
157. See 124 CONG. REC. 29,091, at 30,323 (1978) (statement of Sen. Williams) (supporting an
amendment clarifying that employers could take action against employees who, because of their
alcoholism or drug addiction, were not performing up to their professional standards); Hender-
son, supra note 148, at 728 (stating that Section 504 does not protect drug addicts or alcoholics
who cannot perform their jobs adequately).
158. The Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amend-
ments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (1978) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 706
(1994)). The amendment revised the definition of qualified individual with a handicap by stating
that:
such term does not include any individual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser whose
current use of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from performing the duties of
the job in question or whose employment, by reason of such current alcohol or drug
abuse, would constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others.
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to make clear that "individuals with handicaps" did not include al-
coholics and drug addicts whose disability impaired their job perform-
ance, or by reason of current alcohol or drug abuse, constituted a
direct threat to the property or safety of others.159 Further, Congress
intended to exclude those alcoholics and drug addicts who had not
completed rehabilitation or were not in rehabilitation.16 Members of
Congress recognized, however, that many alcoholics and drug addicts
perform their jobs without incident and do not pose risks to the prop-
erty or safety of others.161 These alcoholics and drug addicts were
protected from being fired or refused employment solely because of
their addictions. 62
Interpreting the amendment created much confusion. Specifically, it
was unclear whether alcoholics or drug addicts whose addiction ren-
dered them unable to adequately fulfill or safely perform their jobs
were handicapped but not otherwise qualified, or simply not handi-
capped.' 63 The distinction was immaterial, however, since the ulti-
mate result was the same. Nonetheless, courts continued to recognize
the clear congressional intent to provide alcoholics and drug addicts
protection from discrimination based solely on their addictions. 164
In drafting the ADA, Congress again recognized that alcoholism
and drug addiction were disabilities deserving protection from dis-
criminatory employment actions.165 However, Congress also sought
to strengthen an employer's ability to ensure alcohol- and drug-free
Id.
159. See H.R. REP No. 1149,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7312, 7333-34 (describing the amendment which excludes alcoholics and drug abusers from the
definition of a "handicapped individual").
160. Id.
161. See 124 CONG. REC. 29,091, at 30,324 (1978) (statement of Sen. Hathaway) (asserting
that alcoholics and addicts often pose no risk to safety and perform adequately).
162. See Whitaker v. Board of Higher Educ., 461 F. Supp. 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding that
the Rehabilitation Act protects alcoholics and drug addicts); see also Davis v. Butcher, 451 F.
Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (holding that exclusion of all job applicants with a history of drug
abuse violated the Rehabilitation Act).
163. Compare Crewe v. United States Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d 140, 143
(8th Cir. 1987) (finding that an alcoholic applicant was handicapped but not otherwise qualified
because of a history of poor job performance and repeated failures at rehabilitation) with Heron
v. McGuire, 803 F.2d. 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that a police officer dismissed for heroin
addiction was not handicapped because the illegal use of drugs made him unfit for the job); see
also Henderson, supra note 148, at 730 n.130 (arguing that the legislative record supports the
conclusion that alcoholism and drug addiction are handicaps, but that an alcoholic or drug addict
may not be otherwise qualified).
164. See, e.g., Crewe, 843 F.2d at 141 (recognizing that alcoholism and drug addiction are
protected disabilities); Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226, 1228 (7th Cir. 1980)
(acknowledging that alcoholism is a protected disability under the Rehabilitation Act).
165. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 3, at 22.
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work environments. 166 Therefore, the new ADA provisions make it
more difficult for an alcoholic or drug addict to raise a claim under the
ADA than the Rehabilitation Act. 67
The ADA seeks a balance between providing otherwise qualified
alcoholics and drug addicts protection from employment discrimina-
tion and the legitimate concerns of workplace health and safety.168
This balance is sought largely through the exclusion of current illegal
drug users from protection under the ADA 169 and by putting forth a
wide range of permissible employer actions relating to alcohol and
drugs. 170
Individuals currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs are ex-
cluded from the definition of a "qualified individual with a disabil-
ity," 7' so long as the employer acts on the basis of current use and not
166. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, at 77-81, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 359-64
(listing various methods employers may use to ensure a drug-free work place, such as drug-
testing); S. REP. No. 116, supra note 3, at 40-42 (stating that an employer may prohibit current
drug use and take steps to ensure current drug use is not occurring).
167. For instance, under the 1978 Amendment a current alcohol or drug abuser was protected
so long as the current abuse did not interfere with the ability to perform job functions or pose a
direct threat to property or the safety of others. See Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (1978)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 706) (excluding those current alcohol abusers or drug users
where the drug or alcohol abuse prevents them from performing their duties or creates a threat
to the safety or property of others). Under the ADA, however, any current illegal use of drugs
places the employee or applicant outside the protection of the statute. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 171-95 (discussing the ADA's exclusion of persons currently using illegal drugs from
ADA protection).
168. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, at 77-81, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 359-64
(balancing the legitimate workplace concerns of employers with the need to protect qualified
alcoholics and drug addicts); S. REP. No. 116, supra note 3, at 40-42.
169. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,114(a) (excluding current illegal drug users from the definition of
"qualified individual with a disability").
170. See id. § 12,114(c). This section provides that a covered entity
1) may prohibit the illegal use of drugs and the use of alcohol at the workplace by all
employees;
2) may require that all employees not be under the influence of alcohol or be engaging
in the illegal use of drugs at the workplace;
3) may require that employees behave in conformance with the requirements estab-
lished under the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988;
4) may hold an employee who engages in the illegal use of drugs or who is an alcoholic
to the same qualification standards for employment or job performance and behavior
that such entity holds other employees, even if any unsatisfactory performance or be-
havior is related to the drug use or alcoholism of such employee; and
5) may, with respect to Federal regulations regarding alcohol and the illegal use of
drugs, require that employees comply with the standards established in such regulations
of the Department of Defense[,J ... the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ... and...
the Department of Transportation.
Id.
171. Id. § 12,114(a).
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on the basis of a protected disability.172 Curiously though, this section
is silent regarding the current misuse of alcohol.173 Although the sec-
tion is titled "Illegal Use of Drugs and Alcohol,"'174 alcoholics cur-
rently abusing alcohol do not appear to be excluded from ADA
protection as are drug addicts currently using illegal drugs.175 Though
there is some evidence that Congress intended to exclude alcoholics
currently engaging in alcohol abuse from the definition of a "qualified
individual with a disability,"' 76 the EEOC Implementing Regula-
tions,177 the Interpretive Guidance, 78 the House and Senate Commit-
172. ld.; see also H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, at 77, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 360
(excluding an illegal drug user from the definition of "a qualified individual with a disability"); S.
REP. No. 116, supra note 3, at 41; 135 CONG. REC. S11,224-5 (1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin)
(indicating concern that employers will use the "currently engaging in" standard to justify other
discriminatory actions against the disabled).
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,114(a) (making reference only to the current illegal use of drugs while
failing to mention anything about alcohol).
174. Id. § 12,114. This section has five subsections. Subsection (a), while making no mention
of alcohol abuse, states that those currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs are excluded
from the term "qualified individual with a disability". Id. § 12,114(a). Subsection (b) likewise
does not mention alcohol abuse, but merely states that those no longer using illegal drugs who
have been rehabilitated or are in rehabilitation are not excluded from the term "qualified indi-
vidual with a disability". Id. § 12,114(b). Subsection (c) as it pertains to alcohol merely states
that employers may prohibit the use of alcohol at the workplace; may require that employees not
be under the influence of alcohol while at work; and may hold an alcoholic employee to the
same standards of performance as other employees. Id. § 12,114(c). Subsection (d) pertains to
drug testing and makes no mention of alcohol use. Id. § 12,114(d). Subsection (e) addresses
employers regulated by the Department of Transportation and allows testing of transportation
employees for the use of drugs and on-duty use of alcohol. Id. § 12,114(e).
175. See id. § 12,114(a) (making no mention of alcohol use) See also H.R. REP. No. 485, supra
note 2, at 77-81, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 359-64 (referring to "illegal" drug use); S.
REP. No. 116, supra note 3, at 40-42 (discussing the exclusion of current illegal drug users from
the term "qualified individuals with a disability" but making no reference to current alcohol
abusers). But see Henderson, supra note 148, at 733 n.158 (arguing that Section 104's title, the
fact most of its subsections pertain to alcohol use, and the legislative history indicate that the
"currently engaging in" standard applies to alcohol use as well).
This exclusion may have been Congress's intent, since alcohol use is legal under most circum-
stances, even when used by alcoholics. If the title "Illegal Use of Drugs and Alcohol" is indica-
tive at all of congressional intent, it supports the conclusion that current alcohol misuse is not to
be excluded from the term "qualified individual with a disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12,114. However,
the fact that "alcohol use" appears in some sections of the ADA but not others indicates that
"alcohol use" appears where Congress wanted it to appear. Furthermore, unlike the illegal use
of drugs, employers cannot ban all employees from engaging in legal misuse of alcohol, therefore
making nondiscriminatory enforcement of a "currently engaging in" alcohol policy impossible.
176. See 135 CoNo. REC. S10,753 (1989) (conversation between Senators Harkin and Arm-
strong) (indicating that Senator Harkin intended to exclude illegal drug users and alcohol abus-
ers from the definition of a "qualified individual with a disability"); id. at S10,777 (conversation
between Senators Harkin and Coats) (showing again Senator Harkin's intention).
177. See supra note 40 (citing the EEOC's regulations).
178. See supra note 44 (citing the Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the ADA).
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tee Reports, 179 and the statute itself, all fail to mention current alcohol
abuse in their discussions of the exclusion of current illegal drug use
from ADA protection. Though the issue is undecided, this Comment
will treat the "currently engaging in" exclusion as not applying to al-
coholics and their current abuse of alcohol.
An individual does not necessarily have to illegally use drugs "that
day" or within a particular time frame to be excluded from ADA pro-
tection.180 "Currently engaging in" means only that use is recent
enough to support a conclusion that the individual engages in such
conduct.' 81 Use recent enough to result in a positive drug test sup-
ports a conclusion that the individual is currently engaging in the use
of illegal drugs. 182
Individuals erroneously believed to be illegally using drugs are not
excluded from ADA protection. 83 This provision is intended to pro-
tect those who erroneously test positive for illegal drug use in em-
ployer administered drug tests.'84 However, for ADA protection to
be afforded an individual erroneously believed to be a drug user, the
employer must also regard the individual as being a drug addict sub-
stantially limited in one or more major life activities. 185 If the em-
ployer only regards the individual as a casual drug user, there is no
refuge in the ADA. 86 This requirement renders ADA protection to
persons falsely accused of drug use illusory, since an employer will
probably not then assume, or at least not admit it assumes, that a posi-
tive drug test means drug addiction.
An "otherwise qualified" drug addict is not excluded from ADA
protection if he or she is no longer illegally using drugs and has suc-
cessfully completed a supervised rehabilitation program, has other-
wise been rehabilitated, or is currently participating in a supervised
rehabilitation program. 8 7 Congress recognized that the public has an
179. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, at 77-81, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 359-64
(making no mention of alcohol abuse); S. REP. No. 116, supra note 3, at 40-42..
180. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.3. See Collings v. Longview Fibre, Co., 63 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that employees' unlawful drug use in the weeks or months prior to dismissal was
sufficient to render them not qualified).






187. 42 U.S.C. § 12,114(b). The plain language of this section seems to indicate that self-
rehabilitation is acceptable, and that completion of a formal treatment program is not required.
See id. (showing that the phrase "or otherwise been rehabilitated," as between two phrases refer-
ring to supervised rehabilitation, supports this notion).
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acute interest in encouraging alcoholics and drug addicts to seek reha-
bilitation. 188 Such an interest is not furthered if the individual fears
continued stigmatization and future adverse actions.189 However, like
the "currently engaging in" standard, alcoholics appear to be excused
from the requirement for rehabilitation. Therefore, rehabilitated drug
addicts and those undergoing rehabilitation may be protected under
the ADA. Further, alcoholics may be protected regardless of any ef-
fort at rehabilitation.
In addition to permitting employers to take adverse employment
action on the basis of current illegal drug use, the ADA specifically
authorizes other employer conduct relating to the control of alcohol
and drug use in the workplace. 190 First, the employer may prohibit
the use of alcohol and the illegal use of drugs in the workplace' 91 and
require that employees not be under the influence of alcohol or drugs
while at work. 192 Second, the employer may require that employees
behave in conformance with the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988.193
Third, the employer may hold the alcoholic or drug addict to the same
performance and behavioral standards as it holds other employees,
even if the substandard performance or behavior is caused by the al-
coholism or drug addiction.194 Finally, an employer regulated by the
Departments of Defense or Transportation, or the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission may require that its employees meet the standards estab-
lished by the agency's regulations regarding alcohol and illegal drug
use.
195
To summarize, drug addicts are protected under the ADA only if
they are not currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs and are
188. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 116, supra note 3, at 106 (statement of Sen. Coats) (arguing that the
ADA strikes the proper balance between allowing employers to institute zero-tolerance alcohol
and drug policies while encouraging employees with substance abuse problems to seek
rehabilitation).
189. Id.
190. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,114(c)(1)-(5) (setting forth permissible employer conduct relating to
the control of alcohol and drug use in the workplace).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. The Drug Free Workplace Act of 1988, 41 U.S.C. § 701 (a)(1)(1988), requires that
employers with government contracts of $25,000 or more ensure a drug-free workplace and 1)
publish a statement notifying their workers that the unlawful manufacture, distribution, dispen-
sation, possession, or use of controlled substances is prohibited in the workplace; 2) notify the
employees that their continued employment hinges on compliance with the policies outlined in
this statement; and 3) establish a drug-free awareness program to inform their employees of the
dangers of drug abuse in the workplace. Id. § 701(a)(1)(A)-(D).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 12,114(c)(1-5). See Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir.
1995) (discussing alcoholism as a "cause" of conduct which results in an employee's discharge).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 12,114(c)(1-5).
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either in rehabilitation, or have been successfully rehabilitated. There
is much confusion over whether alcoholics are excluded if they meet
the "currently engaging in" standard and whether they must also meet
the rehabilitation requirement. It is important to remember that any
impairment, including alcoholism and drug addiction, requires a show-
ing that the impairment substantially limits one or more major life
activities. 196 Therefore, casual drug use and improvident misuse of al-
cohol are not protected under the ADA.197 Employers may prohibit
the illegal use of drugs and misuse of alcohol in the workplace, and
may insist that all employees not be under the influence of drugs or
alcohol during work hours.198 Further, employers may hold alcoholics
and drug addicts to the same performance and behavior standards as
other workers, and may take adverse employment action if those stan-
dards are not met.199 This is so even if the substandard performance
and behavior are due to the alcoholism or drug addiction.200
The primary focus of this Comment has been on who is protected
under the ADA. Next, this Comment will discuss the forms and theo-
ries of discrimination which may be asserted under the ADA, as well
as other prohibited employer conduct.
4. Theories of Discrimination under the ADA
The ADA adopts the powers, remedies, and procedures as set forth
in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.201 As such, claimants may
assert violations of the ADA under either the disparate treatment or
disparate impact theories of employment discrimination set forth in
the Title VII context.20 2 Further, the ADA creates a third theory of
employment discrimination which some have termed "surmountable
barrier discrimination. ' 20 3
196. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.3.
197. Id.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 171-95 (discussing permissible employer activity re-
garding alcohol and drug use in the workplace).
199. 42 U.S.C. § 12,114(c)(1)-(5).
200. Id.
201. See id. § 12,117(a) ("The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 705, 706,
707, 709, and 710 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964... shall be the powers, remedies, and proce-
dures this title provides to ... any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in
violation of any provision of this Act.").
202. See 29 C.F.R § 1630.4 (disparate treatment) and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.7 (disparate impact).
203. Id. § 1630.9. See Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 305 (5th Cir. 1981)
(distinguishing between disparate impact discrimination and surmountable barrier
discrimination).
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a. Disparate Treatment Discrimination
For purposes of the ADA, disparate treatment means that a quali-
fied person with a disability was treated differently because of the dis-
ability.2°4 Because proving intentional discrimination in the Title VII
context was often difficult, the United States Supreme Court in Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green205 set forth a series of procedures
intended to make asserting a claim of intentional discrimination more
plausible.206 These burden shifting procedures were further clarified
in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,207 and were
adopted for claims arising under the ADA.208
Essentially, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing by a
preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of unlawful discrim-
ination.209 This may be done by showing that the plaintiff: 1) belongs
to a protected class; 2) applied for and was qualified for a certain job;
3) was rejected; and 4) that after the rejection the employer continued
to seek to fill the position.210 Once a prima facie case is established,
the burden then shifts to the employer to come forward with a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's rejection.211 The
evidence presented by the employer must raise a genuine issue of fact
as to whether unlawful discrimination occurred. 21 2 If the employer is
successful, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the rea-
son offered for the rejection is not the true reason.21 3 The plaintiff
may do this either by direct evidence of a discriminatory motive or by
arguing that the explanation lacks credence and should be rejected. 21 4
204. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4.
205. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
206. I&
207. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
208. See Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 304 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that
Title VII jurisprudence was applicable to intentional discrimination based on handicap); see also
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(a) (citing Prewitt and stating that the traditional disparate treatment
defenses existing under Title VII jurisprudence apply to claims under the ADA).
209. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (stating that the plain-
tiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case).
210. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
211. See id. at 254 (stating that after the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the de-
fendant then has the burden of producing evidence showing that the plaintiff was rejected for a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason); 29 C.F.R § 1630.15(a) (allowing a legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason as a defense for the challenged action).
212. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
213. Id. at 255.
214. Id.
19961
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b. Disparate Impact Discrimination
The second theory of unlawful discrimination under the ADA is dis-
parate impact discrimination. 215 For purposes of the ADA, "disparate
impact" means that a uniformly applied, neutral hiring criteria has an
adverse impact on an individual with a disability or a disproportion-
ately adverse impact on classes of individuals with disabilities. 216 This
is essentially the disparate impact theory of discrimination articulated
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.2 17 and its progeny. A minor distinction
was noted in Prewitt v. United States Postal Service.218 The Prewitt
court stated that courts must be careful not to group all handicapped
persons into one class or even broad subclasses. 219 For instance, em-
ployers facing disparate impact discrimination charges under Title VII
often point to the diverse makeup of their workforce as probative of
whether the neutral criteria has a disparate impact.220 However, the
fact that an employer has a large group of epileptics does not mean
the employer does not discriminate against the blind.221 Therefore,
the only defense to a charge of disparate impact discrimination under
the ADA is to argue that neutral hiring criteria was required by job-
relatedness and business necessity.222 If the employer is successful in
showing job-relatedness and business necessity, the burden shifts back
215. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.7
It is unlawful for a covered entity to use standards, criteria, or methods of administra-
tion, which are not job-related and consistent with business necessity, and (a) That have
the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability; or (b) That perpetuate the discrim-
ination of others who are subject to common administrative control.
Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(b) -(c) (defining disparate impact in terms of the ADA).
216. Id. § 1630.7. Disparate impact theory was first articulated by the Supreme Court in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Griggs court found that establishing a job
requirement having nothing to do with predicting successful job performance but impacting dis-
proportionately on protected classes of employees was unlawful discrimination regardless of the
employer's intent. Id. at 436. Similarly, in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), the Court
made clear that the disparate impact standard necessary in the Title VII context to ensure that
congressional efforts to end discrimination "would not ring hollow" applied with equal force to
handicap discrimination. Id. at 297. See also International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (approving the use of statistics to prove disparate impact discrimina-
tion); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977) (narrowing the application
of statistical evidence to the employer's relevant labor market).
217. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
218. 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981).
219. Id. at 307.
220. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1118 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing the fire
department's defense that a "no-beard" policy did not have a disparate impact on blacks since
there was a fair proportion of blacks on the fire department).
221. Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 307.
222. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b) & (c).
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to the plaintiff to show that the neutral criteria was met, or could have
been met with a reasonable accommodation.2 23
c. Surmountable Barrier Discrimination
The third theory under which a claim of unlawful discrimination
could be brought is known as surmountable barrier discrimination.224
Surmountable barrier discrimination occurs when an employer refuses
to provide reasonable accommodations to a qualified disabled individ-
ual.225 If the employee is otherwise qualified but requires accommo-
dation to perform an essential job function, the accommodation must
be provided as long as it is reasonable.226 The only defenses to a
charge of surmountable barrier discrimination are that the accommo-
dation proposed is unreasonable 227 or imposes an undue burden on
the employer.228 If the employer meets its burden of persuasion by
establishing that an accommodation is unreasonable or an undue bur-
den, the burden of persuasion then shifts back to the plaintiff to come
forward with sufficient evidence concerning his abilities and possible
accommodations sufficient to rebut the employer's evidence.229
5. Medical Examinations and Disability-Related Inquiries
The ADA prohibits an employer from conducting any medical ex-
amination or disability-related inquiry prior to a conditional offer of
employment.230 Further, an employer may only require medical ex-
aminations and make disability-related inquiries when the inquiries
are made of all employees in certain job categories. 231 Congress rec-
ognized that employers often conduct pre-employment medical exam-
223. Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 307.
224. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(b)(5)(A) (defining discrimination to include an employer's failure
to reasonably accommodate the limitations of an otherwise qualified disabled individual); 29
C.F.R. § 1630.9 (requiring employers to reasonably accommodate the needs of disabled
individuals).
225. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(b)(5)(A). See Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 307 (holding that failure to provide
a reasonable accommodation to an otherwise qualified handicapped employee constitutes un-
lawful surmountable barrier discrimination).
226. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(b)(5)(A).
227. See Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995) (defin-
ing the term "reasonable" in cost/benefit terms and as it relates to the accommodation of quali-
fied disabled individuals).
228. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d).
229. See id. app. § 1630.15(d) (providing that if an accommodation imposes an undue hardship
upon an employer, the employer may offer a defense against a charge of failing to reasonably
accommodate); Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 308 (stating that once an employer presents evidence of
undue hardship, the plaintiff must rebut such evidence).
230. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(d)(2) & (3).
231. Id. § 12,112(d)(3)(A).
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inations and inquiries to uncover hidden disabilities.2 32 Since such
inquiries are frequently made at the pre-employment stage, a rejected
applicant does not know or is unable to prove that the rejection was
based on a real or perceived disability revealed in the inquiry.233
Once a conditional offer of employment is made, the employer may
not rescind its offer based on the medical examination results and dis-
ability-related inquiries unless the employer's actions are justified by
job-relatedness and business necessity. 234
The conditional offer of employment must be a bona fide offer.235
An offer is bona fide if it satisfies the general principles of contract
law governing offers.236 Prior to an offer, the employer must complete
all relevant nonmedical inquiries and determine that the applicant is
qualified.237 Only then may the employer extend the conditional offer
of employment.2 38 Medical examinations and inquiries cannot pro-
ceed until the offer is made.239
After an offer is made, the employer may require a medical exami-
nation and make disability-related inquiries regardless of whether the
examinations or inquiries are job related.2 40 "Medical examinations
are procedures or tests that seek information about the existence, na-
ture, or severity of an individual's physical or mental impairment. '2 41
The EEOC guidelines set out eight factors to consider when determin-
232. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, at 72, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 355; S. REP.
No. 116, supra note 3, at 39.
233. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 3 at 38-39.
234. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3).
235. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, No. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE:
PREEMPLOYMENT DISAILITY-RELATED INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS UNDER THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Act OF 1990, 36 (1994) [hereinafter EEOC ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE].
236. Id. at 36 n.53. See Soar v. National Football League Players Ass'n, 550 F.2d 1287, 1290
(1st Cir. 1977) (holding that the terms of an offer must be of sufficient explicitness that a court
can determine the respective obligations of the parties); see also ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CoNRCrs § 11 (1960 & West Supp. 1991) (defining an offer as an expression by one party of
his assent to certain definite terms, provided that the other party involved in the bargaining
transaction will likewise assent to identical terms); CHARLES G. BAKALY & JOEL M. GROSSMAN,
MODERN LAW OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACrS 29 (1988) (stating that the terms of a valid offer of
employment must be reasonably definite).
237. See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 235, at 37; H.R. REP. No. 485, supra
note 2, at 73, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 355 (indicating legislative intent as to what types
of inquiries may be made prior to an offer employment); S. REP. No. 116, supra note 3, at 39
(indicating a congressional intent to require employers to evaluate the applicant's ability to per-
form the job before considering medical condition).
238. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 235, at 38.
239. Id.
240. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3).
241. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 235, at 28.
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ing if a certain procedure or test is a medical examination.242
Although drug tests meet most if not all of these factors, tests
designed solely to determine the use of illegal drugs are not medical
examinations.243 However, if the drug testing procedures are such
that the use of prescription drugs will be revealed, the drug test is a
medical examination. 2 " In addition, a test to determine the use of
alcohol is a medical examination if it employs invasive procedures. 245
The EEOC considers the drawing of breath, a common method of
testing for alcohol use and the method required under OTETA, to be
an invasive procedure.246
Disability-related inquiries are inquiries likely to elicit information
about a disability.24 7 Inquiries pertaining to the ability to perform cer-
tain job functions are not considered disability-related. 248 Therefore,
242. See id. (listing eight factors for consideration when determining if a certain procedure
constitutes a medical examination). These eight factors are as follows:
1) Whether the procedure or test is one that is administered by either a health care
professional or someone trained by a health care professional;
2) Whether the results of the procedure or test are interpreted by either a health care
professional or someone trained by a health care professional;
3) Whether the procedure or test is designed to reveal the existence, nature, or severity
of an impairment, or the subject's general physical or psychological health;
4) Whether the employer is administering the procedure or test for the purpose of
revealing the existence, nature, or severity of an impairment, or the subject's general
physical or psychological health;
5) Whether the procedure or test is invasive (e.g., whether it requires the drawing of
blood, urine, breath, etc.);
6) Whether the procedure or test measures physiological or psychological responses of
an individual, as opposed to the individual's performance of a task;
7) Whether the procedure or test would normally be administered in a medical setting
(e.g., a health care professional's office, a hospital); and
8) Whether medical equipment or devices are used for administering.the procedure or
test (e.g., medical diagnostic equipment or devices).
IdL; see also Evans v. City of Evanston, 695 F. Supp. 922, 928 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (determining that
physical agility tests designed to test activities that the applicant will be required to perform on
the job are not medical examinations).
243. 42 U.S.C. § 12,114(d)(1). Note that drug tests, even those strictly limited to the detection
of illegal drugs, meet the EEOC's Enforcement Guidance for determining when a procedure or
test is a medical examination. See supra note 242 (listing the factors to consider when determin-
ing if a procedure is a medical examination). Therefore, excluding tests for the use of illegal
drugs from the realm of medical examinations appears to be an arbitrary political compromise
designed to appease legislators concerned with weakening employers' ability to maintain a drug-
free workplace. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 116, supra note 3, at 106 (statement of Sen. Coats) (expres-
sing satisfaction that the amendments he proposed to S. 933 ensuring employers' maintenance of
a drug-free workplace through drug testing without liability for discrimination were passed).
244. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.16(c) (providing that tests to discover the use of illegal drugs
are not considered a medical examination).
245. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 235, at 36.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 6.
248. Id. at 9.
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an employer operating a painting service could ask applicants whether
they have any problems climbing up and down ladders, although such
an inquiry may reveal a disability. Further, an employer may ask
about current and past illegal drug use249 because such activity is
outside the scope of ADA protection. However, an employer may not
ask about the extent of any illegal drug use or whether the applicant
has ever received treatment for alcohol or drug problems, since this
inquiry could reveal an alcohol- or drug-related disability.250 Once
the conditional offer of employment is made, it may not be rescinded
based on the results of the medical examination or disability-related
inquiry unless justified by job-relatedness or business necessity. 251
Medical and disability-related information obtained in the course of
medical examinations and inquiries are subject to stringent confidenti-
ality requirements. 252 The release of medical information is prohib-
ited, except as expressly provided for in the ADA.25 3 During the
hiring process, only those company officials who need to know the
information shall have access to it.254 Every employee involved in the
hiring process does not usually need to know the applicant's medical
information.255 For instance, an employee verifying the applicant's
employment history does not need to know the applicant's medical
history. Therefore, employers must take steps to keep medical infor-
mation from those who do not need to know the information.
6. The ADA: Concluding Remarks
Employers have three primary concerns regarding ADA require-
ments. First, employers feel that ambiguous terms and fact-specific
249. Id. at 20.
250. Id. at 21.
251. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3).
252. See 42 U.S.C § 12,112(d)(3)(B) (requiring medical information be maintained on sepa-
rate forms, in separate files, and as confidential medical records). Medical information must be
kept confidential except:
1) Supervisors and managers may be informed regarding necessary restrictions on the
work or duties of the employee and necessary accommodations;
2) First aid and safety personnel may be informed, when appropriate, if the disability
might require emergency treatment; and
3) Government officials investigating compliance with [the ADA] shall be provided
relevant information on request.
Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(0 (permitting use of medical information for purposes of ad-
ministering health insurance, life insurance, and other benefit plans); id. § 1630.14 (permitting
use of medical information in compliance with state workers' compensation laws).
253. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112 (c)(3)(b).
254. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 235, at 44.
255. Id.
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determinations required under the ADA invite expensive litigation.256
Employers may take solace in the fact that the ADA adopted many of
the judicial interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act, and therefore a
large body of case law already exists interpreting key terms of the
ADA. However, employers should not expect to be alleviated from
the burden of fact-specific inquiries and case-by-case determinations.
Second, employers are concerned that the ADA will merely protect
the malfeasants, malcontents, and hypochondriacs of their work
forces. 257 However, ADA protection is limited to impairments sub-
stantially limiting one or major life activities. Further, the burden of
proving such an impairment rests with the employee. Also, employers
are permitted to hold alcoholics and drug addicts to the same per-
formance standards as other members of the workforce, and may take
aggressive measures to ensure an alcohol- and drug-free work
environment.
The third concern of employers is that the ADA makes it harder to
comply with other existing federal and state laws. 258 Here, employers
will find little solace. For example, one federal law which renders
ADA compliance a more perilous task is OTETA.
B. The Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act
On October 28, 1991, President Bush signed the Omnibus Transpor-
tation Employee Testing Act (OTETA) into law.259 OTETA directed
the Secretary of Transportation to implement regulations requiring
the alcohol and drug testing of employees in safety-sensitive positions
in the aviation, motor carrier, rail, and transit industries.260 OTETA
specifically required that employers test employees in safety-sensitive
positions for alcohol and drugs as a pre-employment requirement,
256. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text (setting forth the three major concerns of
employers regarding the ADA). For example, individualized inquiries are required to determine
whether a person is otherwise qualified, see supra text accompanying notes 67-91; whether an
accommodation imposes an undue burden, see supra text accompanying notes 132-47; and
whether an individual poses a direct threat to the safety of others, see supra notes 95-131 and
accompanying text.
257. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing employers' concerns about the
ADA's possible protection of the "hypochondriacs, malfeasants, and malcontents" of their work
forces).
258. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (stating that the ADA creates difficulties
for employers in that it conflicts with ERISA and NLRA).
259. Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act, Pub. L. No. 102-143, 105 Stat. 952 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
260. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1434.
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randomly, after certain accidents, and upon reasonable suspicion of
alcohol or drug abuse.261
In February of 1994, the United States Department of Transporta-
tion (USDOT) and five of its agencies published final rules imple-
menting OTETA. 62 Employers of commercial motor vehicle drivers,
covered by the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) final
rule,2 63 are the largest group affected.264 Considering that the FHWA
Rule has the greatest impact, and that other agency rules are, for the
most part, similar to the FHWA Rule, this Comment focuses almost
exclusively on the FHWA Rule.
1. Applicability and Implementation
The FHWA Rule applies to employees performing safety-sensitive
functions who are required to have Commercial Driver's Licenses
(CDL's). 65 Generally, the affected employees operate vehicles with
gross vehicle weight ratings (GVWR) or gross combination weight
ratings (GCWR) of over 26,000 pounds, vehicles designed to seat 16
261. Id. The constitutionality of United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) man-
dated alcohol and drug testing is well established. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989) (holding that USDOT-mandated drug testing implicated the
Fourth Amendment, but was not an unreasonable search considering the public policy concerns
and regulatory scheme); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 657
(1989) (holding that a showing of a drug abuse problem in a particular industry or occupation is
not necessary to justify a drug testing requirement); see also International Bd. of Teamsters v.
Department of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292, 1309 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding the Federal Highway
Administration's requirement for pre-employment, random, post-accident, and reasonable suspi-
cion drug testing for interstate truck drivers); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Skinner,
913 F.2d 1454, 1464 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding the constitutionality of the Research and Special
Programs Administration's requirement of pre-employment, random, and post-accident drug
testing of pipeline workers in safety-sensitive positions); Bluestein v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451, 457-
58 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1083 (1991) (upholding the constitutionality of the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration's requirement that certain categories of employees in the commer-
cial aviation industry undergo random drug testing). But see Transportation Inst. v. Coast
Guard, 727 F. Supp. 648, 656 (D.D.C. 1989) (holding that the Coast Guard's requirement for
random drug testing of all vessel crew members was unconstitutional because the Coast Guard
failed to establish that all vessel crew members engaged in safety-sensitive functions).
262. Alcohol and Drug Testing for Transportation Workers, 59 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1994) (Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA) Rules to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 219, Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) Rules to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 121, Federal Transit Administration
(FTA) Rules to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 653, Research and Special Programs Administration
(RSPA) Rules to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 199, Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
Rules to be codified at 49 C.F.R § 382).
263. 49 C.F.R. § 382 (1994).
264. See S. Rap. No. 54, supra note 12, at 15 (estimating that 538,000 domestic air carrier
employees and 31,816 FAA employees will be covered by the FAA regulations, 90,000 employ-
ees will be covered by the FRA regulations, 195,000 employees will be covered by the FTA
regulations, and 5.5 million employees will be covered by the FHWA regulations).
265. 49 C.F.R. §§ 383.1 - 383.155.
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or more passengers, including the driver, or vehicles used to transport
hazardous materials 266 which require placards.267
An "employer" under the FHWA Rule is any person or entity who
owns or leases a commercial motor vehicle for which a CDL license is
required, or assigns persons to operate such a vehicle. 268 The defini-
tion of "employer" includes the United States, a State, or any political
subdivision of a State.269 Unlike other FHWA safety regulations, the
FHWA Rule implementing OTETA is applicable to both intrastate
and interstate operations. 270 The FHWA Rule establishes a staggered
implementation process based on employer size.271 Employers with
50 or more CDL drivers on March 17, 1994 must begin compliance by
January 1, 1995,272 and smaller employers, by January 1, 1996.273
2. Alcohol and Drug Testing Procedures
Under the FHWA Rule, drug testing requires the collection of a
urine sample, coupled with detailed procedures to ensure the sample's
integrity and reliable test results.274 After collection, the sample is
split into two separate containers. 275 One container is tested as the
primary sample, the other is tested only if the primary sample reveals
illegal drugs and the employee requests validation of the result.276 A
chain of custody must be established, 277 and the specimens must be
forwarded to a National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) approved
laboratory.278 The laboratory must test for only five drugs: mari-
266. See id. § 172.101 (listing all materials considered hazardous for transportation purposes).
See also id. §§ 172.500 - 172.560 (establishing when hazardous material placards are required).
267. See id. § 383.5 (defining the term "commercial motor vehicle").
268. Id. § 382.107.
269. Id.
270. For example, the FHWA's driver qualification requirements, id. § 391.11, maintenance
requirements, id. §§ 393, 396, and hours of service requirements, id. § 395, apply only to inter-
state truck drivers.
271. Id. § 382.115.
272. Id. § 382.115(a).
273. Id § 382.115(b).
274. Id. § 382.105; see Procedures for Transportation Workplace Alcohol and Drug Testing
Programs, 49 C.F.R. § 40 (1994) (setting forth, inter alia, the procedures used to ensure the integ-
rity of the collection process and protection against false positive results). For a more compre-
hensive explanation of the Procedures for Transportation Workplace Alcohol and Drug Testing
Programs, see OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION, THm EMPLOYER'S GUIDE TO 49
CFR PART 40 (1990).
275. 49 C.F.R. § 40.25 (f)(10)(ii) (1994).
276. Id. § 40.33.
277. Id. § 40.25(c).
278. Id. § 40.39.
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juana, cocaine, opiates, amphetamines, and phencyclidine.279 The em-
ployer may test for additional drugs only under an authority
independent of OTETA if a separate sample is taken.280
The NIDA-certified laboratory conducts an initial enzyme multi-
plier immunoassay screen.281 If the test is negative, a negative result is
reported to the employer.2 82 If the result is positive, the laboratory
must then conduct a gas chromatography/mass spectrometry confir-
matory test.283 If the result of that test is negative, then a negative
result is reported to the employer.284 If the confirmatory test is posi-
tive, a Medical Review Officer (MRO) reviews the results.28 5 The
MRO is a licensed physician with experience in substance abuse disor-
ders and trained in interpreting positive test results.286 The MRO con-
ducts an interview with the employee to determine medical history
and other relevant biomedical information.287 If the MRO determines
that a legitimate medical explanation exists, a negative result is re-
279. Id. § 40.21(a). Testing for additional drugs is not permitted under the FHWA Rule. Id.
§ 40.21(c).
280. Id. § 40.21(c).
281. Id. § 40.29(e). The enzyme multiplier immunoassay test is relatively inexpensive and in-
volves mixing a portion of the urine specimen with an antigen. Ross A. Epstein, Note, Urinalysis
Testing in Correctional Facilities, 67 B.U. L. REV. 475, 482 (1987). The test is only capable of
detecting the presence or absence of a specific drug, and cannot quantify its result. Id. at 483.
For a further discussion of the immunoassay process, see id. at 481-503 (discussing the scientific
theory behind the enzyme multiplier immunoassay test, its limitations, and the controversy sur-
rounding it in both federal and state courts). See also Charles E. Leal, Comment, Admissibility
of Biochemical Urinalysis Testing Results for Purposes of Detecting Marijuana Use, 20 WAKE
FoREST L. REV. 391, 392-98 (1984) (providing explanations of the various drug testing proce-
dures that lawyers can understand).
282. 49 C.F.R. § 40.29(g)(2).
283. Id. § 40.29(0(1). The gas chromatography/mass spectrometry is a much more expensive
and accurate test. Mark A. Rothstein, Drug Testing in the Workplace: The Challenge to Employ-
ment Relations and Employment Law, 63 Cmi.-KEr L. REV. 683, 693 (1987). The drugs are
extracted from the urine and converted into a gas. Id. They are then sent through a helium
tube. Id. The mass spectrometry process determines molecular weights and quantifies the
amount of drug present. Id.
284. 49 C.F.R. § 40.29(g)(2).
285. Id. § 40.33(a).
286. Id. § 40.33(b)(1).
287. Id. § 40.33(b)(3). The MRO must make a reasonable effort to contact the employee. Id.
§ 40.33(c)(1)-(5). If after a reasonable effort the MRO is unsuccessful, the MRO contacts the
employer and requests that the employer contact the employee, the employer then directs the
employee to contact the MRO. Id. If the employer is unable to contact the employee, the
employee is placed on temporary medically unqualified status. Id. If the employer contacts the
employee, but the employee fails to contact the MRO, the MRO may report a positive test result
to the employer after 5 days. Id.
INTERACTION OF ADA AND OTETA
ported to the employer. 288 If there is no such explanation, a positive
result is reported.289
If the MRO determines there is no medical explanation for the pos-
itive laboratory result, the employee is considered to have failed the
drug test and that result is reported to the employer. However, an
employee may request that the separate "split" sample be tested by an
independent NIDA-certified laboratory. If the independent labora-
tory fails to confirm the presence of illegal drugs in the sample, then
the test is canceled and the employee is exonerated.
Alcohol testing requires a breath sample, which is obtained by
blowing into an approved breath-testing device operated by a trained
technician. 290 The testing must be done at a site which preserves the
employee's privacy and the confidentiality of test results.291
The FHWA Rule requires that employers promulgate a written al-
cohol and drug testing policy.292 All affected employees must receive
a copy of the policy. 293 Contained within the policy must be informa-
tion concerning the signs and symptoms of an alcohol or drug prob-
lem, how alcohol and drug abuse affect an employee's work and home
life, and where employees may turn if they feel they have an alcohol
or drug problem.294
3. Required Testing and Other Employer Obligations
OTETA requires applicants for safety-sensitive positions to submit
to and pass a pre-employment drug test.295 Also, the employer must
ask the applicant's previous employers whether the applicant has ever
failed an OTETA-mandated alcohol or drug test.296 Employees who
perform safety-sensitive functions must submit to alcohol and drug
tests on a random basis, after certain accidents, and upon reasonable
suspicion the employee is under the influence of alcohol or drugs.297
288. Id. § 40.33(c)(6).
289. Id.
290. Id. § 40.51. The device is one approved by the National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration. Id.
291. Id. § 40.57(a).
292. Id. § 382.601.
293. Id. § 382.601(a)(1).
294. Id. § 382.601(b)(11).
295. See infra notes 298-99 and accompanying text (explaining the pre-employment testing
requirements).
296. See infra text accompanying notes 300-04 (discussing the requirement that employers
make pre-employment inquiries and obtain information on previously conducted alcohol and
drug tests).
297. See infra text accompanying notes 305-50 (explaining the random, post accident, and
reasonable suspicion alcohol and drug testing requirements).
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a. Pre-Employment Testing and Inquiries
An applicant must submit to a drug test as a pre-qualification condi-
tion.298 The applicant may not perform safety-sensitive functions until
the employer receives a negative drug test result.299
The employer must also inquire into the existence of positive alco-
hol or drug test results and refusals to be tested from the applicant's
previous employment. 300 The employer is required to obtain from the
applicant's previous employers all information concerning positive al-
cohol and drug tests and refusals to be tested within the last two
years.301 The release of this information is subject to the applicant's
consent.302 However, if the employer does not receive the informa-
tion within 14 days of employment, the employee driver must cease
performing safety-sensitive functions until the information is re-
ceived.30 3 Thus, the driver's ability to refuse consent and retain em-
ployment is limited. Previous employers must release information
regarding a former driver's positive test results when a subsequent
employer requests the information and presents the former driver's
signed written consent.3°4
b. Random Testing
Employers must also establish procedures for random alcohol and
drug testing.30 5 The employer must conduct random alcohol tests at
298. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 2717(a) (directing the issuance of regulations requiring motor carri-
ers to conduct pre-employment tests, including tests for alcohol or drug use); 49 C.F.R. § 382.301
(mandating that a driver undergo drug and alcohol tests prior to performing safety-sensitive
functions).
299. 49 C.F.R. § 382.301(a). A pre-employment alcohol test is not required. On May 15,
1995, the USDOT suspended the requirement. See 60 Fed. Reg. 24,765 (1995). The FHWA
Rule initially required pre-employment alcohol and drug testing. 49 C.F.R. § 382.301. Pre-em-
ployment alcohol testing was hotly contested by the transportation industry who viewed the
requirement as wasteful and having little impact on transportation safety. See Comments, 59
Fed. Reg. 7340, 7342 (1994) (restating the transportation industry's expressions of concern over
the pre-employment alcohol testing requirement). The FHWA agreed, but felt that the require-
ment was mandated by OTETA, and the Agency therefore lacked the authority to disregard it.
See Comments, 59 Fed. Reg. 7484, 7487 (1994) (agreeing that pre-employment alcohol testing
will have a minimal affect on transportation safety, but further stating that doing away with the
requirement required re-writing the legislation, which was beyond the Agency's authority). The
controversy was resolved in American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Federal Highway Admin., 51 F.3d
405 (4th Cir. 1995), when the United States Court of Appeals ruled that the FHWA had discre-
tion to abandon the pre-employment alcohol testing requirement. Id. at 414.
300. 49 C.F.R. § 382.413(b).
301. Id
302. Id.
303. Id. § 382.413(c).
304. 1& § 382.405(0.
305. I& § 382.305.
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an annual rate of 25 percent of the average number of CDL driver
positions,306 and random drug tests at an annual rate of 50 percent of
the average number of CDL positions.30 7 The employer must reason-
ably disperse the tests throughout the year. 30 8
The FHWA Rule requires that the employer use a "scientifically
valid" selection process, but allows the employer to establish its own
selection methodology so long as each driver has an equal opportunity
of selection each time.3°9 An employer's selection process may be as
crude as putting all names in a "hat" or as sophisticated as computer
software that randomly chooses assigned numbers. Another option
available to an employer is to join a consortium. 310 A consortium is
an association of employers whose alcohol and drug testing programs
are administered by a common third party.311 Drivers employed by
consortium members may be placed into one testing pool. The con-
sortium then randomly selects drivers for testing. So long as the con-
sortium tests at the required rates, each consortium member is in
compliance even though the selection rates for an individual employer
may fall below the required rates.312
The selection system used must be truly random. Each driver must
have an equal chance of selection. 31 3 Drivers picked at one selection
return to the pool for the next selection.314 Therefore it is possible for
some drivers to be selected many times and other drivers not at all.
Employees selected for random alcohol or drug tests must proceed
immediately to the collection facility after being notified of their se-
lection.315 Random alcohol tests must be conducted just before, dur-
ing, or just after performing safety-sensitive functions. 316 For
example, if an employee selected for a random alcohol test was per-
forming only clerical duties that day, the employer should not test the
employee then. The employer would keep the employee's selection
306. Id § 382.305(a)(1).
307. Id. § 382.305(a)(2).
308. Id § 382.305(g). For example, an employer with an average of 100 driver positions must
conduct 25 random alcohol tests and 50 random drug tests spread out over the course of the
year. The employer may not, however, conduct all tests during the same month, or half the tests
one month, and the other half in a subsequent month.
309. Id. § 382.305(e).
310. See id. § 382.305(0 (explaining calculation of the testing rates if the employer is a mem-
ber of a consortium).
311. Id. § 382.107.
312. Id. § 382.305(0.
313. Id. § 382.305(e).
314. Id.
315. Id. § 382.305(h).
316. Id. § 382.305(i).
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confidential and test the employee the next time he or she performs
safety-sensitive functions. Employees selected for random drug tests,
however, may be tested at any time.317
c. Post Accident Testing
Employees involved in certain commercial motor vehicle accidents
must submit to alcohol and drug testing.318 The FHWA Rule requires
testing of all surviving employees involved in fatal accidents.319 Driv-
ers must also be tested if issued a traffic citation for a moving violation
arising from an accident in which there are either personal injuries
treated immediately and away from the scene of the accident, or one
or more of the vehicles are towed from the scene due to disabling
damage. 320 Employers have a duty to provide employees with suffi-
cient training, information, and procedures so that employees will
comply with the requirements. 321 Employees have a duty to remain
available for testing.322 The employer may consider failure to remain
available a refusal to be tested.323 An employee who is deemed to
have refused to submit to any of the tests required under OTETA
suffers the same ramifications as if the employee tested positive. 324
These ramifications are explained below. 325
Employees involved in accidents meeting the above criteria must
submit to an alcohol test as soon as practical,326 but no later than two
317. Id. § 382.305(h).
318. Id. § 382.303(a)-(e).
319. Id. § 382.303(a)(1).
320. Id. § 382.303(a)(2). See id. § 382.1.07 (referring the reader to 49 C.F.R. § 390.5 for further
definitions used in the subchapter). Section 390.5 defines the term "accident" as:
an occurrence involving a commercial motor vehicle operating on a public road which
results in
i) A fatality;
ii) Bodily injury to a person who, as a result of the injury, immediately receives medi-
cal treatment away from the scene of the accident; or
iii) One or more motor vehicles incurring disabling damage as a result of the accident,
requiring the vehicle to be transported away from the scene by a tow truck or other
vehicle.
Id. § 390.5.
321. Id. § 382.303(d).
322. Id. § 382.303(c).
323. Id.
324. See id. § 382.211 (stating that no driver shall refuse any post-accident, random, reason-
able suspicion, or follow-up alcohol or drug test); see also id. §§ 382.501 & 382.503 (setting forth
the ramifications for employees who violate the FHWA Rule, including employees who refuse to
be tested).
325. See infra text accompanying notes 351-65 (discussing the consequences for employees
who fail an OTETA-required test).
326. 49 C.F.R. § 382.303(a).
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hours after the accident.327 If an alcohol test is not performed within
that time, but is completed within eight hours of the accident, the em-
ployer must document the reason for the delay.328 If the alcohol test
is not performed within eight hours, the employer must cease attempts
to test the driver and document why the test was not performed. 329
Drivers may not consume alcohol until the test is conducted, or for
eight hours, whichever occurs first.330
Following an accident meeting the above criteria, employees must
also submit to a drug test.331 The test must be conducted as soon as
practical,332 but no later than 32 hours after the accident. 333 If the
drug test is not performed within 32 hours, the employer must cease
attempts to test the driver and document why the test was not
performed. 33
If a law enforcement agency orders an alcohol or drug test in con-
junction with its accident investigation, and the employer obtains the
results, the employer need not conduct that test.335 For example, if
the police have probable cause to believe the driver is under the influ-
ence of alcohol and order a test, the employer does not have to con-
duct its own alcohol test, provided the employer obtains the results.
However, unless the law enforcement agency conducts a drug test as
well, the employer still must conduct that test.336
d. Reasonable Suspicion Testing
An employer must require that an employee submit to an alcohol or
drug test when reasonable suspicion exists to believe the employee is
under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 337 Reasonable suspicion must
be based on specific and contemporaneous observations concerning
the appearance, behavior, speech, or body odors of the employee. 338
A supervisor trained in detecting indicators of probable alcohol and
drug misuse must make the observations.339 Supervisors must receive,
327. Id. § 382.303(b)(1).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. § 382.209.
331. Id. § 382.303(a).
332. Id.
333. Id. § 382.303(b)(2).
334. Id.
335. Id. § 382.303(e).
336. Id.
337. Id. § 382.307(a-f).
338. Id. § 382.307(a) (alcohol) & (b) (drugs).
339. Id. § 382.307(c).
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and document, at least sixty minutes of training on alcohol abuse and
sixty minutes of training on drug abuse.340
Observations generating reasonable suspicion of alcohol misuse
must occur just before, during, or just after an employee performs a
safety-sensitive function. 341 Once observed, the driver may not per-
form safety-sensitive functions until the driver submits to an alcohol
test and the driver's alcohol concentration is below 0.02.342 The em-
ployer should administer the test within two hours of the observa-
tion.343 If not, the employer must document the reason for the
delay.3" If the test is not conducted within eight hours, the employer
must cease attempts to test the employee and document why the test
was not conducted. 345 Regardless of whether the test is conducted,
the employee may not perform safety-sensitive functions for 24 hours
after reasonable suspicion exists. 346
Conducting a drug test based on reasonable suspicion does not re-
quire that the behavior giving rise to the suspicion occur in association
with performing a safety-sensitive function.347 Because proscribed
drug use is unlawful whenever it occurs, it results in sustained impact
on performance, the observation may occur while the driver is off-
duty or performing activities not considered safety-sensitive.3 48 If the
employer has reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated FWHA
rules proscribing drug use, the employer must require the driver to
submit to a drug test.349 The supervisor making the observation must
document what indicators gave rise to the suspicion.350
4. Ramifications of Failing a FHWA-Required Alcohol or Drug
Test
If an employee tests positive for alcohol or drugs, the employee
may not perform safety-sensitive functions before satisfying certain
requirements. One requirement is that the employee must be retested
and receive a negative result.35' In addition, employers must refer
340. Id. § 382.603.
341. Id. § 382.307(d).
342. Id. § 382.307(e)(2)(i).
343. Id. § 382.307(e)(1).
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. § 382.307(e)(2)(ii).
347. See id. § 382.307 (specifying only that controlled substance tests be based on specific,
contemporaneous and articulable observations).
348. Id.
349. Id. § 382.307(b).
350. Id. § 382.307(c).
351. Id. § 382.301(a).
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employed CDL drivers with positive tests to a Substance Abuse Pro-
fessional (SAP).352 A SAP is a licensed physician, psychologist, social
worker, or addiction counselor with knowledge of and clinical experi-
ence in the diagnosis and treatment of alcohol and drug abuse disor-
ders.35 3 If the employer wishes to retain the driver, or is required by
other law or agreement to retain the driver, an SAP must evaluate the
driver.354 The SAP determines what assistance, if any, the driver
needs in resolving problems associated with alcohol and drugs. 35 5 If
the SAP determines that the driver does not need assistance, the
driver may return to performing safety-sensitive functions after either
an alcohol test indicating concentration of less than 0.02, or a negative
drug test, depending upon what test the driver failed.356
If the SAP finds that the employee needs additional assistance, the
SAP prescribes a course of rehabilitation.35 7 The employee may not
return to performing safety-sensitive functions until the SAP deter-
mines that the employee has properly completed the rehabilitation
program prescribed. 358 The employee must also submit to a return-to-
work test.359 Additionally, the employee must submit to unan-
nounced follow-up alcohol or drug tests after the driver's return to
duty.36° The SAP determines the number and frequency of tests, but
there may not be less than six tests in the first twelve months.361 The
SAP may terminate the follow-up tests after the employer conducts at
least six tests.362 However, follow-up testing may not continue for
more than 60 months after the driver's return.363
The FHWA Rule does not place a duty on employers to pay for
substance abuse evaluation and treatment. 364 It states only that the
employer should assign the costs in accordance with employer/em-
ployee agreements and employer policies.3 65 Many employers will
simply make it their policy to give the required referral and terminate
the driver. The FHWA Rule does not prohibit this. However, other
352. Id. § 382.605(a).
353. Id § 382.107.
354. id. § 382.605(b).
355. Id.
356. Id. § 382.605(c)(1).
357. Id. § 382.605(b).
358. Id. § 382.605(c)(2)(i).
359. Id. § 382.605(c)(1).








laws, as well as collective bargaining and other employer/employee
agreements may limit the employer's options.
5. Concluding Remarks: OTETA
OTETA-mandated alcohol and drug testing is probably here to
stay. The constitutionality of such requirements is well established
and the requirements appear invulnerable to attack on other fronts.366
Employers of transportation workers performing safety-sensitive
functions must ensure that their employees submit to and pass pre-
employment, random, post-accident and reasonable suspicion alcohol
and drug tests.367 Further, employers must obtain from an applicant's
previous employers the results of positive alcohol and drug tests, and
release to a former employee's new employer these results when
presented with the driver's written consent.3 68 Employees who fail an
alcohol or drug test may not perform safety-sensitive functions until
they are evaluated by an SAP, successfully complete any prescribed
rehabilitation regimen and pass a return-to-work alcohol and drug
test.
36 9
Implementing and administering these requirements is a considera-
ble burden and expense to transportation employers.370 Regardless,
the transportation industry generally supports the requirements. 371
Most transportation employers feel that alcohol and drug testing con-
tributes significantly to transportation safety, and welcome federal
support for employment practices they would implement regardless of
a regulatory mandate.372 However, the ADA interferes with OTETA
366. See supra note 261 (addressing the constitutionality of USDOT mandated alcohol and
drug testing).
367. See supra text accompanying notes 298-350 (explaining pre-employment, random, post-
accident and reasonable suspicion alcohol and drug tests required by OTETA for workers per-
forming safety-sensitive functions).
368. See supra text accompanying notes 300-04 (explaining OTETA's requirement for pre-
employment inquiries).
369. See supra text accompanying notes 351-65 (discussing OTETA's requirements for re-
turning to work after failing an OTETA-required test).
370. See Michael Richman, American Trucking Association Fights DOT Alcohol Test Require-
ments in Court, TRAFFIC WORLD, J. OF CoM. 50 (Aug. 1, 1994) (quoting Secretary of Transporta-
tion Federico Pena as stating that, when the USDOT rules were first established, alcohol and
drug testing would cost the industry approximately 200 million dollars annually).
371. Id. (quoting American Trucking Association (ATA) General Counsel Linda Mounts as
stating that the ATA has vigorously supported past USDOT drug testing initiatives, but views
the pre-employment alcohol test requirement as an unnecessary expense). See also S. REP. No.
54, supra note 12, at 5 (citing a Motor Carrier Safety Survey of trucking industry employees
indicating that 68 percent supported random drug testing and 90 percent supported post-acci-
dent testing).
372. See S. REP. No. 54, supra note 12, at 5 (stating that during a strike, Greyhound deter-
mined that 30 percent of its applicants failed a pre-employment drug test).
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and the desire for an alcohol and drug-free transportation system.
Presently, this interaction unnecessarily requires transportation em-
ployers to walk a fine regulatory tightrope. Therefore, this Comment
next addresses the interaction of the ADA with OTETA and identifies
the pitfalls facing employers required to comply with both.
II. ANALYSIS - THE CONFLICT AND INTERACTION OF THE ADA
WITH OTETA
This section discusses how the ADA and OTETA interact and the
perils facing employers required to comply with both. Section A dis-
cusses OTETA's requirement that new employers obtain, and previ-
ous employers release, the results of an applicant's alcohol and drug
tests administered within the last two years, and how it conflicts with
the ADA's confidentiality requirements. To resolve this conflict, Sec-
tion B proposes that the EEOC find that alcohol tests administered to
detect only the on-duty use of alcohol are not medical examinations
and therefore not subject to the ADA's confidentiality requirements.
Since the EEOC has already held that drug test results reflecting only
the use of illegal drugs do not constitute medical records subject to the
ADA's confidentiality requirements, the EEOC should be consistent
and require parallel treatment of alcohol and drug test results.
Section C explores the question whether, given the ADA's protec-
tion of alcoholics and drug addicts, a transportation employer could
institute a blanket policy excluding from further employment consid-
eration in safety-sensitive positions all applicants whose OTETA-re-
quired pre-employment background check revealed a failed alcohol or
drug test. The section first describes how one could mount a chal-
lenge to this hiring criteria, and concludes that the disparate impact
theory of disability discrimination makes the criteria vulnerable to
attack.
This section next probes the strengths and the weaknesses of two
defenses. The first defense is that the blanket policy does not discrim-
inate under the ADA because these applicants pose a direct threat to
the safety of others.373 The second defense argues that the policy is
justified by the business necessity of reducing exposure to tort liability
by keeping drivers with records of alcohol or drug abuse off the
roads.374 The analysis concludes that a blanket exclusion of these ap-
plicants violates the ADA. Further, both defenses lead to a common
373. See infra text accompanying notes 426-78 (exploring whether the direct threat defense
justifies blanket exclusions of all applicants who previously failed an OTETA test).
374. See infra text accompanying notes 479-511 (exploring whether the business necessity de-
fense justifies blanket exclusion of applicants who previously failed an OTETA test).
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point, with the employer having to show that the threat of harm is
substantially increased. 375
Section D argues that Congress must modify the direct threat stan-
dard because applying the standard to employers of workers engaged
in safety-sensitive functions is contrary to sound public policy. The
direct threat standard requires that employers show that employing
the applicant would substantially increase a significant risk to safety.
Congress could not have intended to require users of the nation's
transportation system to incur an increased threat to safety lying
somewhere between "slightly increased" and "substantially increased"
when enacting the ADA. Therefore, Section D proposes a modified
direct threat standard. The modified direct threat standard would al-
low employers to deny employment to persons who posed only an
increased risk to safety, if the risk was to others, and the essential job
functions required performance of safety-sensitive functions while in
contact with others. This standard would better serve the nation's
goal of a crash-free transportation system while causing only a minus-
cule loss of protection for the disabled.
A. The Requirement that Employers Release Alcohol Test Results
upon Request from Subsequent Employers Violates the
ADA'S Confidentiality Provisions
The ADA strictly limits the circumstances under which an employer
may release confidential medical information.376 EEOC enforcement
guidelines state that employers may only release information to third
parties as expressly provided by law.377 The employer's obligation to
maintain the confidentiality of medical records does not begin with or
terminate with the employment relationship. 378 Therefore, employers
must keep medical information obtained during pre-employment
processing confidential even though the employer did not hire the in-
dividual.379 Likewise, all medical information must remain confiden-
tial after the employment relationship terminates.380
OTETA requires that employers obtain the results of an applicant's
positive alcohol and drug tests conducted within the last two years
375. See infra part II.C.3 (finding that both defenses require the employer to demonstrate a
high probability of harm).
376. See supra text accompanying notes 230-55 (explaining the ADA's requirements for re-
lease of medical records).
377. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 235, at 45.
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from the applicant's previous employers. 38' Once the current em-
ployer presents the previous employer with the employee's written
consent authorizing release of the alcohol and drug tests results,
OTETA requires the previous employer to release the information to
the requesting employer. 382 If the current employer does not obtain
the information within 14 days of employment, the employee must
cease engaging in safety-sensitive functions until the information is
obtained.383
Under the ADA, a drug test strictly limited to determining only the
use of illegal drugs does not constitute a medical examination.384
Therefore, the results of these drug tests are not medical records sub-
ject to the ADA's confidentiality requirements. 385 However, if any
portion of the drug testing procedures reveal the use of prescription or
other legal drugs, then the confidentiality requirements apply to the
test results.386 As long as employers conduct their drug testing so that
the tests are not medical examinations, then employers may release
drug test results to subsequent employers without violating the ADA's
confidentiality provisions. 387
However, OTETA-mandated alcohol tests qualify as medical exam-
inations, since they require the invasive procedure of drawing
breath.3ss Therefore, alcohol test results must remain a confidential
medical record. Accordingly, they may only be released to third par-
ties as expressly provided by the ADA.389 The ADA does not ex-
pressly provide for the release of confidential medical records to other
employers, with or without the employee's consent. Therefore, the
OTETA's rule requiring employers to release alcohol test results to a
former employee's new employer conflicts with the ADA's confidenti-
ality provisions.
This conflict is addressed in the USDOT's rulemaking.3 90 The US-
DOT agrees that if alcohol testing qualifies as a medical examination
under the ADA, then employers must maintain alcohol test results as
381. 49 C.F.R. § 382.413(b).
382. 1d. § 382.405(f).
383. Id. § 382.413(c).
384. 42 U.S.C. § 12,114(d)(1).
385. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.16(c) (stating that only information regarding use of otherwise
legal drugs which may indicate a disability must be kept as confidential medical records).
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 235, at 28-29.
389. See supra note 252 (listing exceptions to the required confidentiality of medical records).




confidential medical records. 391 However, the USDOT feels that
since their regulation requires release of the records only after the
employee gives written consent, it is consistent with the medical com-
munity's accepted standards regarding the release of confidential
medical records and with the ADA.392 The USDOT argues that the
intent of any confidentiality provision is to protect the employee's
right to privacy.393 The employee can waive this right according to the
USDOT.394 The USDOT further states that "[i]t would clearly be
anomalous to view a medical records confidentiality provision as
prohibiting an employee from voluntarily agreeing that a previous em-
ployer.., could send a medical record to a current employer .... ,,395
The USDOT does not discuss the coercive nature of how the current
employer obtains the employee's consent, in that continued employ-
ment is conditioned upon providing consent.396 It may be somewhat
presumptuous of the USDOT to equate consistency in accepted medi-
cal standards governing the release of confidential medical records
with compliance with the ADA's standards governing the release of
confidential medical records. Nonetheless, this places employers sen-
sitive to ADA compliance in a no-win situation, with the choice of
complying with the strict tenets of the ADA and violating OTETA, or
complying with OTETA and violating the ADA.
B. Proposed Solution: The EEOC Should Reverse its Finding that
Tests to Determine the On-Duty Use of Alcohol Are
Medical Examinations
The conflict between the ADA's confidentiality of medical records
provisions and OTETA's requirement that employers release alcohol
and drug test results to subsequent employers is best reconciled
through an EEOC determination that tests to determine the on-duty
use of alcohol do not constitute medical examinations. The EEOC
has already held that drug tests to determine the use of illegal drugs
are not medical examinations. 397 The rationale behind this decision
suggests that even though drug tests may identify a possible disability
(i.e. drug addiction) the employer may base employment decisions on
the current use of illegal drugs, and may prohibit their use. Under the






397. See supra text accompanying notes 242-46 (discussing the EEOC's conclusion that tests
used to determine drug use are not medical examinations for ADA purposes).
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ADA, these drug tests are not medical examinations even though they
require much more intrusive procedures and greater medical expertise
to conduct and interpret than OTETA's breath-based alcohol test.398
The same rationale applies with equal if not greater force to tests
used to determine the on-duty use of alcohol. As with the current use
of illegal drugs, the employer may base employment decisions on and
prohibit the on-duty use of alcohol.399 Though OTETA alcohol tests
meet the requirements set by the EEOC to qualify as medical exami-
nations, and they provide results which could indicate a possible disa-
bility (i.e. alcoholism) the same holds true for drug tests. Further,
OTETA breath alcohol tests are far less intrusive, requiring only the
rendering of a breath sample as opposed to blood or urine, and re-
quire far less medical expertise to conduct the test and interpret the
results. Therefore, it makes little sense to hold that tests for illegal
drug use are not medical examinations but tests for the on-duty use of
alcohol are.
If breath alcohol tests used to determine the on-duty use of alcohol
are not medical examinations, then the conflict between OTETA's re-
quirement for the release of alcohol test results and the ADA's confi-
dentiality requirements disappears.
C. Interaction: May Employers Refuse to Hire all Applicants with
Records of Failing OTETA-Required Alcohol or Drug
Tests without Violating the ADA?
In the interest of safety and reducing their exposure to tort liability,
many transportation employers may want hiring policies that elimi-
nate all applicants with histories of failing OTETA-required alcohol
or drug tests. This particularly holds true since OTETA requires em-
ployers to obtain this information,400 and employers may be charged
with knowledge of the applicant's propensity for alcohol or drug mis-
use in any potential litigation.401 While access to an applicant's previ-
ous alcohol and drug test results is a new source of hiring data for
transportation employers, the great majority of employers have al-
ways reviewed an applicant's driving record for drunk and drugged
398. See supra text accompanying notes 245-46 (discussing the EEOC's conclusion that tests
used to determine alcohol use are medical examinations for ADA purposes).
399. 42 U.S.C. § 12,114(c).
400. 49 C.F.R. § 382.413(b).
401. See infra text accompanying notes 479-92 (discussing negligent hiring liability).
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driving convictions.402 Congress specifically recognized this by stating
in the House Conference Report that
licensing of motor carrier drivers and railroad engineers, and certifi-
cation of airplane pilots involves consideration of drunk and drug-
related driving convictions, as recorded by individual States and
made available to employers through the National Drivers Register
at the Department of Transportation. In addition, records of other
drug or alcohol related violations of State or Federal law may be
considered as indicators of "fitness for duty" for safety-sensitive
transportation positions.403
The phrase "records of other drug or alcohol related violations of
State or Federal law" indicates an intent to allow employers to con-
sider records of failing OTETA-required alcohol or drug tests when
making hiring decisions. If this is Congress's intent, it is not readily
apparent in the ADA or its implementing regulations. Admittedly,
this statement falls short of evincing an intent to sanction employer
policies providing for the blanket exclusion of all applicants with
records of failing OTETA-required tests. However, Congress clearly
did want transportation employers to have the opportunity to consider
past records of drunk and drugged driving convictions, a common
practice throughout the transportation industry. It is unclear whether
Congress intended to allow transportation employers to continue the
common practice of categorically excluding all applicants with drunk
or drugged driving convictions.
If an employer could categorically exclude all applicants with drunk
or drugged driving convictions, why couldn't the employer exclude all
applicants with records of failing OTETA-required alcohol or drug
tests? The only distinction lies in that the former is a conviction, while
the latter is simply the result of a test conducted by the employer.
This distinction should carry little weight though, since the procedural
safeguards instituted to ensure testing reliability and protect the em-
ployee's rights have withstood judicial scrutiny.404 Unfortunately, the
ADA and the EEOC implementing regulations bring the legality of
these common sense hiring procedures into question.
402. 49 C.F.R. §§ 391.23 & 391.25. Interstate trucking operations subject to the FHWA's
safety regulations are required to obtain a copy of the driver's state motor vehicle record and
conduct an annual review of the driver's driving record. Id.
403. H.R REP. No. 485, supra note 2, at 78, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 361.
404. See supra note 261 (addressing the constitutionality of USDOT-mandated alcohol and
drug testing).
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1. Disparate Impact Discrimination
An employer's policy of refusing employment to all applicants with
records of failing OTETA-required alcohol or drug tests is a neutral
hiring criteria uniformly applied. Therefore, an applicant must chal-
lenge this policy under the disparate impact theory of employment
discrimination. 405 Nonetheless, the threshold question in any ADA
claim is whether the applicant suffers from a disability.4° A person is
disabled only if one possesses a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record of
such impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment. °7
An applicant who failed an OTETA-required alcohol or drug test
with a previous employer arguably has a record of an impairment, but
for this to qualify as disabled under the ADA the impairment must
also have substantially limited the individual in one or more major life
activities. 408 Mere casual drug use or the improvident misuse of alco-
hol does not substantially limit one or more major life activities, and
therefore does not amount to a disability.40 9 If failing the OTETA-
required alcohol or drug test resulted from factors short of addiction,
such as poor judgment in deciding to have a few drinks over lunch, the
ADA does not protect the applicant. Further, ADA protection does
not extend to individuals currently using illegal drugs. 410
In the context of OTETA, evidence of whether the positive alcohol
or drug test resulted from behavior linked to a substantially limiting
disability would likely come from the SAP's evaluation. The SAP de-
termines the extent of the individual's alcohol or drug problems and
recommends a course of treatment.411 The SAP evaluation must oc-
cur before an applicant who previously failed an OTETA-required al-
cohol or drug test can be otherwise qualified.412 The burden of proof
405. See supra text accompanying notes 204-14 (discussing disparate impact discrimination).
406. See Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 942 (10th Cir. 1994) (discussing whether the
plaintiff in this ADA claim suffered from a disability after a work-related injury occurred which
resulted in his employer refusing to rehire him).
407. See supra text accompanying notes 37-65 (defining "disability" under the ADA).
408. See Flasza v. TNT Holland Motor Express, Inc., 159 F.R.D. 672, 677 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(finding that the plaintiff was not disabled because he did not have a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limited one or more major life activities, had no record of such impair-
ment, and was not regarded as having such impairment).
409. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.3.
410. 42 U.S.C. § 12,114(a).




is on the applicants to come forward with the SAP evaluation indicat-
ing that alcoholism or drug addiction disabled them.413
Even if applicants suffer from a disability within the meaning of the
ADA, employers may still reject applicants if they are not otherwise
qualified. 414 First, the applicant must meet the position's appropriate
standards and qualifications. 415 The applicant must satisfy all USDOT
or appropriate state regulations pertaining to the qualifications of em-
ployees performing safety-sensitive functions. The ADA expressly
permits employers regulated by the USDOT to require that employ-
ees performing safety-sensitive functions comply with the USDOT's
regulations. 416 If the employer is subject to federal or state safety reg-
ulations, applicants need to possess a valid CDL license 417 and meet
the FHWA's or their state's physical and driver qualification require-
ments.418 Additionally, applicants who previously failed OTETA-re-
quired alcohol or drug tests must undergo an evaluation by the SAP,
successfully complete all rehabilitation prescribed, and pass a return-
to-work test.419 Finally, the employer may also establish neutral, job-
related requirements for the applicants, such as previous experience
and a satisfactory driving record.420
The second step of the "otherwise qualified" analysis is to deter-
mine whether the applicant can, either with or without reasonable ac-
commodation, perform the essential functions of the job.42 1 Provided
that the applicant meets all the criteria in step one and does not cur-
rently suffer from any other disability, a rehabilitated alcoholic or
413. See supra text accompanying notes 66-91 (explaining that the burden of proof is on the
employee to prove they are otherwise qualified).
414. See supra text accompanying notes 66-91 (discussing the "otherwise qualified" standard).
415. See supra text accompanying note 68 (discussing satisfaction of the job position's objec-
tive criteria).
416. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,114(c)(5)(C) (stating that an employer may require that employees
comply with USDOT's regulations for safety-sensitive functions if the employer is subject to the
USDOT's regulations); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(b)(6) (providing that employers subject to regula-
tions of the Department of Defense, Department of Transportation and Nuclear Regulatory
Commission may require employees in safety-sensitive positions to comply with those regula-
tions); see also S. REP. No. 116, supra note 3, at 27 (stating that disabled employees covered by
USDOT regulations must satisfy the physical qualification standards to be otherwise qualified).
417. 49 C.F.R. § 383.
418. Id. § 391.41(b)(1) - (13).
419. See supra text accompanying notes 351-65 (explaining the requirements needing satisfac-
tion before an employee who failed an OTETA test may return to performing safety-sensitive
functions).
420. See supra text accompanying note 68 (discussing satisfaction of the job position's objec-
tive criteria).
421. See supra text accompanying notes 70-91 (discussing factors to consider when determin-
ing whether a job function is essential).
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drug addict would not normally require a reasonable accommodation
to successfully perform the essential functions of the job.422
Therefore, applicants who previously failed OTETA-required alco-
hol or drug tests find protection under the ADA only if alcoholism or
drug addiction disabled them, they are otherwise qualified by reason
of meeting all licensing requirements, FHWA physical requirements,
the employer's neutral and job-related hiring criteria, have success-
fully completed rehabilitation, and do not currently use drugs unlaw-
fully.42 3 The ADA protects otherwise qualified individuals with
disabilities who without reasonable accommodation can perform the
essential functions of the job.424 They could therefore challenge an
employer's policy of excluding from employment consideration all ap-
plicants with a record of failing an OTETA-required alcohol or drug
test as resulting in a disparate impact in violation of the ADA. Such a
policy involves a neutral hiring criteria with a disparate impact since it
operates to deny employment to otherwise qualified individuals with
disabilities, i.e. alcoholics or drug addicts who have satisfied OTETA's
scheme for returning to performing safety-sensitive functions after
failing a required alcohol or drug test. The employer can only defend
against such a charge by showing either that the applicants are not
otherwise qualified because they posed a direct threat to the safety of
themselves or others, or that the neutral hiring criteria is job-related
and required by business necessity. 425
2. Employer Defenses to a Charge of Disparate Impact
Discrimination
a. Direct Threat to the Safety of Self or Others
Once an applicant establishes a prima facie case of discrimination,
the employer must defend the neutral hiring criteria as being rooted in
job-relatedness and business necessity.426 Safety concerns are fre-
quently invoked in such endeavors.427 However, invoking safety con-
422. See supra text accompanying notes 351-65 (explaining the requirements for an applicant
who previously failed an OTETA test to be otherwise qualified).
423. If the "currently engaging in" standard applies to alcohol use as well, the driver cannot
be currently engaging in the misuse of alcohol. See supra, notes 171-79 and accompanying text
(discussing the confusion regarding whether the "currently engaging in" standard applied to
alcoholics).
424. See supra text accompanying notes 66-91 (defining otherwise qualified individuals with
disabilities).
425. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(1)-(b)(2).
426. Id.
427. See, e.g., Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1394 (5th Cir. 1993) (naming safety
concerns as the basis for a policy preventing insulin-dependent diabetics and employees with
impaired vision from working as primary drivers); Sarsycki v. United Parcel Serv., 862 F. Supp.
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cerns under the ADA requires satisfaction of the "direct threat"
standard.428 The standard is met if an individualized assessment de-
termines that there exists a significant risk of substantial harm.42 9 A
"significant risk" means a high probability of harm to an individual or
others.430 The risk must be more than slightly increased, and the fear
of harm cannot be merely speculative or remote.431 Courts have dif-
fered, however, regarding whether individualized assessments are re-
quired and what constitutes a significant risk of substantial harm.432
The USDOT safety regulations have been influential in determining
whether individualized assessments are required. 433 Recall that in
Chandler v. City of Dallas,43 the Fifth Circuit held that since USDOT
safety regulations prohibited insulin-dependent diabetics from em-
ployment as interstate truck drivers, an insulin-dependent driver was a
direct threat as a matter of law. The insulin-dependent driver was a
direct threat even though the USDOT safety regulations did not spe-
cifically apply to him.435 Also, in Davis v. Meese,436 a federal district
court upheld the FBI's blanket exclusion of insulin-dependent diabet-
ics from special agent positions.437 The court stated that blanket ex-
clusions were permitted if they substantially furthered legitimate
safety and job performance concerns. 438
However, recent decisions distinguish both Chandler and Davis. In
Sarsycki v. United Parcel Service,439 a federal district court held that,
because the federal safety standards banning insulin-dependent driv-
ers did not apply to Sarsycki, the ADA requires an individual assess-
ment of the threat Sarsycki's insulin-dependent diabetes poses to the
336,340 (W.D. Okla. 1994) (using safety concerns as the reason for a rule banning insulin-depen-
dent diabetics from driver positions).
428. See supra text accompanying notes 92-131 (discussing the direct threat standard).
429. See supra text accompanying notes 92-131 (discussing the direct threat standard).
430. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
431. Id.
432. Compare Chandler, 2 F.3d at 1395 (holding that insulin-dependent drivers were a direct
threat as a matter of law) with Sarsycki, 862 F. Supp. at 340-41 (ruling that as long as FHWA
regulations did not apply to the specific driver, an individual assessment of the threat posed was
required before an insulin-dependent diabetic could be excluded from a driving position).
433. See Chandler, 2 F.3d at 1395 (eschewing an individual assessment in holding that insulin-
dependent diabetics are not otherwise qualified to operate motor vehicles as a matter of law);
Sarsyki, 862 F. Supp. at 340-41 (examining USDOT regulations to determine whether an individ-
ual assessment was necessary).
434. 2 F.3d 1385 (5th Cir. 1993).
435. Id. at 1395.
436. 692 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd without opinion, 865 F.2d 592 (3rd Cir. 1989).
437. Id. at 521.
438. Id. at 517-18.
439. 862 F. Supp. 336 (W.D. Okla. 1994).
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health and safety of others."40 Therefore, so long as the FHWA stan-
dards do not apply, the ADA prohibits blanket exclusion of all insu-
lin-dependent diabetics.' 1 The court questioned the validity of
Chandler, observing that since Chandler, the FHWA relaxed its total
ban on insulin-dependent drivers by instituting a waiver program." 2
Also, in Bombrys v. City of Toledo," 3 a federal district court re-
fused to uphold the Toledo Police Department's blanket exclusion of
insulin-dependent diabetics from police officer positions.4 " The court
distinguished Davis by observing that the case was decided before the
enactment of the ADA, which subjects blanket exclusions to the strict-
est scrutiny." 5
Despite the apparent conflict, an individual assessment is a required
element of the direct threat defense. Applicants with records of alco-
holism or drug addiction disabilities who have failed an OTETA-re-
quired alcohol or drug test in the past two years, but who have
satisfied OTETA's requirements to return to performing safety-sensi-
tive functions, are sufficiently distinguishable from the employees in
Chandler and Davis. Unlike the employees in Chandler, FHWA regu-
lations do not ban these applicants from driving. In fact, FHWA regu-
lations issued under OTETA provide the mechanism for an applicant
to qualify to drive again.446 Thus, once these applicants satisfy certain
requirements of FHWA, they are not banned from driving.
Though the same FHWA physical requirements which prohibit in-
sulin-dependent diabetics from operating commercial motor vehicles
also apply to alcoholics and drug addicts, the prohibition is limited to
only those applicants with a current clinical diagnosis."47 If the appli-
cant satisfies FWHA's regulatory scheme to return to performing
440. Id. at 340-41.
441. Id.
442. Id. at 341.
443. 849 F. Supp. 1210 (N.D. Ohio 1993).
444. Id. at 1218-19.
445. Id. at 1219-20.
446. See supra notes 351-65 and accompanying text (explaining how employees who failed
OTETA-required test may again be qualified to perform safety-sensitive functions under FHWA
rules).
447. See 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(12) (stating that current users of Schedule I drugs - amphet-
amines, narcotics, or other habit-forming drugs - are physically unqualified); Id
§ 391.41(b)(13) (stating that individuals with a current clinical diagnosis of alcoholism are physi-
cally unqualified); see also MEDICAL REGULATORY CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION UNDER 49
C.F.R. PART 391.41(b)(1-13), UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 18 (defining
current clinical diagnosis of alcoholism as encompassing "a current alcoholic illness or those
instances where the individual's physical condition ... has not fully stabilized").
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safety-sensitive functions, there should not be a current clinical diag-
nosis of alcoholism or drug addiction.448
The Davis court held that a law enforcement employer's blanket
exclusion hiring policy was acceptable if it substantially furthered le-
gitimate safety concerns.449 But in the transportation industry, US-
DOT safety regulations establish the hiring criteria.450 As Sarsycki
noted, an employer must conduct an individual assessment if it applies
USDOT hiring criteria in circumstances not covered by the safety reg-
ulations.451 Therefore, an applicant with a record of alcoholism or
drug addiction who previously failed an OTETA-required alcohol or
drug test, but who currently meets FHWA safety standards, cannot be
excluded because of safety concerns without an individual assessment
of whether the applicant poses a direct threat.
Finding that an individual assessment is necessary is only half the
inquiry. An applicant may still be denied employment if the employer
conducts an individual assessment and determines that a direct threat
exists.452 When conducting an individual assessment, an employer
must consider: 1) the duration of the risk; 2) the nature and severity
of the potential harm; 3) the likelihood that the potential harm will
occur; and 4) the imminence of potential harm.453 The first two fac-
tors are known to the employer making the determination, but the
remaining factors involve speculation.
The duration of the risk is a function of the type of driving position
applied for. If the position involves only local deliveries for a short
period of the work day, the duration of risk is short. However, many
driving positions require long distance, over-the-road hauling, with lit-
tle or no direct supervision. For these positions, the duration of risk is
great. The nature and severity of harm is also great. Truck drivers
interact with the public for many hours each day while operating
80,000 pound tractor trailers.454 Performing these functions while
448. See supra text accompanying notes 351-65 (explaining the return to duty and follow-up
testing requirements that ensure that a driver does not have a current alcohol or drug illness).
449. See Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. 505, 517-18 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd without opinion, 865
F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding the FBI's blanket exclusion to be rationally based on medical
opinion and health and safety concerns).
450. See 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(1) - (13) (specifying requirements a person must satisfy to be
physically qualified to drive a motor vehicle).
451. See Sarsycki v. United Parcel Serv., 862 F. Supp. 336, 340-41 (W.D. Okla. 1994) (stating
that an individual assessment was required because the USDOT regulations did not apply to the
vehicle to be driven by the applicant).
452. See supra notes 92-131 and accompanying text (discussing the direct threat standard).
453. 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(r).
454. FHWA hours of service regulations permit a truck driver to drive for 10 hours. 49 C.F.R.
§ 395.3(a). The driver may continue for another 10 hours only after 8 consecutive hours off-
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under the influence of alcohol or drugs has the potential for grave
disaster and multiple loss of life.4 55
The likelihood and imminence of the potential harm is largely un-
known. Predicting which alcoholics and drug addicts will suffer re-
lapses requires knowledge of each applicant's social and economic
background, family life, the degree and type of stress in the applicant's
life, the maturity and sophistication of the applicant's coping mecha-
nisms, the type of treatment received, and a myriad of other factors
the employer has no way of determining or evaluating.456 The SAP's
evaluation aids the employer, but that evaluation may have occurred
as much as two years earlier. Moreover, even the best mental health
practitioners cannot predict with certainty who will suffer relapses.45 7
Nonetheless, in Schmidt v. Safeway, Inc. ,458 a federal district court
held that an alcoholic truck driver does not necessarily pose a direct
threat.459 Though the case arose prior to implementation of OTETA,
the facts are illustrative of a scenario which will likely be played out
with greater frequency under OTETA. The employee in Schmidt was
fired after a urinalysis revealed he had reported to work under the
influence of alcohol. 460 The test was ordered after supervisors sus-
pected the employee of being drunk on duty.461 The MRO believed
that once the employee completed a rehabilitation program, the em-
ployee would be capable of safely driving a truck.462 After the em-
ployee was terminated, he brought suit claiming that, as an alcoholic,
he is entitled under the ADA to the reasonable accommodation of
time off to complete a rehabilitation program.463
The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the employer's de-
fense that the employee posed a direct threat to the safety of
others.464 The court granted the motion, holding that the employer
duty. Id. This process may repeat itself until the driver has been on-duty 70 hours in the last 8
consecutive days. Id.
455. See S. REP. No. 54, supra note 12, at 3-4 (citing a litany of trucking fatalities in which
truck drivers were under the influence of alcohol or drug abuse).
456. See Peter E. Nathan, Alcohol Dependancy Prevention and Early Intervention, 103 PuB.
HEALTH REP. 683, 684 (1988) (pointing out that treatment outcomes vary depending on a
number of factors specific to the patient).
457. Id.
458. 864 F. Supp. 991 (D. Or. 1994).
459. See id. at 978 (stating that an alcoholic truck driver was not a direct threat where em-
ployer's MRO believed the driver would be able to safely drive a truck after completing a reha-
bilitation program).
460. Id. at 998.
461. Id.
462. Id. at 997.
463. Id. at 996.
464. Id. at 998-99.
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failed to put forth any evidence establishing that the employee had a
high probability of relapse.465 On the contrary, the employer's MRO
found that the employee would be able to safely operate a truck after
rehabilitation.466 Further, the employee would have to obtain the
MRO's certification that he could safely operate the truck prior to
returning to work.467 Allowing the employee a leave of absence to
undergo rehabilitation was a reasonable accommodation which suffi-
ciently mitigated any direct threat.468 The district court did find, how-
ever, that the ADA would not protect the employee if the firing was
based on an evenly applied employer policy prohibiting on-duty
intoxication. 469
Schmidt is not useful to employers who, based on concerns for
safety and reducing exposure to tort liability, prefer not to hire appli-
cants who have previously failed OTETA-required alcohol or drug
tests. However, it is too early to tell how far Schmidt will extend.
Therefore, it is helpful to explore other theories which may support
denial of employment to these applicants.
Employers seeking to deny employment to applicants with a record
of alcoholism or drug addiction based solely on their record of failing
an OTETA-required test within the last two years may find support in
Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights.470 Siefken was dismissed after
his employer conducted an inquiry into an incident where he had a
hypoglycemic episode while driving his police car. 471 Siefken argued
that his diabetes was under better control since the episode, and that
the ADA required the employer to reasonably accommodate him by
giving him another chance.472 The court rejected this argument, hold-
ing that one serious safety incident sufficiently met the direct threat
standard, and the employer was not required to endure the possibility
of a second episode.473 An inquiry conducted by the employer into






469. Id. at 1001.
470. No. 94-C-2404, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13015 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 1994), aff'd, 65 F.3d 664
(7th Cir. 1995).
471. Id. at *1-2.
472. Id. at *2.
473. Id. at *7.
474. Id. at *6-7.
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Since OTETA-required alcohol and drug tests are narrowly tailored
to test for the presence of alcohol or drugs only in conjunction with
the employee's performance of safety-sensitive functions, 475 failing an
OTETA-required test indicates the employee was performing or was
about to perform safety-sensitive functions while under the influence
of alcohol or drugs. This is a serious safety hazard just as a hypoglyce-
mic episode is a serious safety incident to a diabetic. The inquiry re-
quired under OTETA, which reflects whether the applicant came to
work drunk or under the influence of drugs in the last two years,
should satisfy the individual assessment requirement. Like Siefken, al-
coholics or drug addicts who fail an OTETA-required test must subse-
quently satisfy OTETA's scheme to return to performing safety-
sensitive functions by establishing that their alcoholism or drug addic-
tion is under better control. But as the district court in Siefien recog-
nized, to predict when a diabetic will have a hypoglycemic episode is
difficult, if not impossible, regardless of how well their condition is
under control.476
It is equally as difficult to predict when an alcoholic or drug addict
will suffer a relapse.477 Surely, Congress did not intend to provide
greater protection to alcoholics and drug addicts than it does to
diabetics. If one hypoglycemic episode is sufficient to conclude that a
diabetic poses a direct threat, courts should also find that the failure of
one alcohol or drug test is sufficient to find that an alcoholic or drug
addict poses a direct threat. Siefken was a current employee and not
an applicant. But it is difficult to argue that Siefken's current em-
ployer should not be required to risk the possibility of Siefken suffer-
ing a second serious safety incident while any subsequent employer
must assume that risk.
The ADA's stringent standards and employers' limited ability to
predict alcohol or drug relapses create great difficulty for employers
trying to meet the direct threat standard. Admittedly, truly rehabili-
tated alcoholics or drug addicts do not pose direct threats as long as
their condition remains stable. However, the employer's and the
mental health community's inability to identify the truly rehabilitated
creates an increased risk.478 Whether the public should incur a risk
lying somewhere between "slightly increased" and "high probability
475. See supra text accompanying notes 259-61 (explaining that OTETA was implemented to
require testing of employees who engaged in safety-sensitive functions).
476. Sieftken, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *6.
477. See Nathan, supra note 456, at 684 ("[A]s surveys of the treatment outcome literature ...
continue to show, even when long-term, alcohol dependant persons are treated, treatments are
only partly effective.").
478. Id. at 684.
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of substantial harm" is a public policy issue Congress may not have
fully appreciated.
b. Avoidance of Negligent Hiring Liability as a Business Necessity
Aside from safety concerns, an employer may argue that a blanket
policy excluding all applicants with records of failing OTETA-re-
quired alcohol or drug tests is required by the business necessity of
mitigating tort liability exposure. Whether this is a viable business ne-
cessity defense under the ADA has not been resolved. However,
courts entertaining this argument in other employment discrimination
contexts have been unsympathetic.4 79
Fear of negligent hiring suits is an overriding concern in establishing
hiring criteria, particularly in the transportation industry. A negligent
hiring claim arises when an employer knew or should have known that
an applicant was unfit for the position, the unfitness created a danger
to third parties, and the employer hired the applicant anyway.480 The
negligent hiring claim is attractive for plaintiffs because it is not neces-
sary, as in respondeat superior claims, to show that the employee was
acting within the scope of employment.481 For instance, in Malorney
v. B & L Motor Freight, Inc. ,482 a trucking company's driver picked up
and raped a hitchhiker. 483 The driver had previous criminal convic-
tions for sexual crimes while employed with other trucking companies
involving this same modus operandi.484 The driver answered "None"
to an employment application question regarding criminal convic-
tions.485 However, the employer failed to verify the information.486
Ruling on the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court
479. See, e.g., International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 210 (1991) (point-
ing out that if state tort law furthers discrimination in the workplace, then it impedes the will of
Congress); Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc., 892 F.2d 1481, 1492 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495
U.S. 948 (1990) (finding that increased tort liability exposure in hiring a truck driver who used
peyote for religious purposes was too speculative and remote to justify a discriminatory employ-
ment practice).
480. Easley v. Apollo Detective Agency, 387 N.E.2d 1241, 1249 (I11. App. Ct. 1979). See also
53 AM. JUR. 2D Master & Servant § 422 (1970) (stating that retaining in employ a servant who
is, or should be, known to be incompetent, habitually negligent, or otherwise unfit, is negligence
on the part of the master that will render him liable for injuries to third persons resulting from
the acts of the incompetent).
481. See Malorney v. B & L Motor Freight, 496 N.E.2d 1086, 1088 (Ii. App. Ct. 1986), cert.
denied, 113 Il.2d 560 (1986) (stating employers have a duty to exercise reasonable diligence in
hiring, and that failure to exercise such care may subject an employer to negligent hiring in
Illinois).
482. 496 N.E.2d 1086 (I11. App. Ct. 1986), cert denied, 113 II.2d 560 (1986).
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held that an issue of fact existed whether the trucking company
breached its duty to hire competent drivers by failing to investigate
the driver's non-driving background. 487
Cases relating directly to the negligent hiring of alcoholics or drug
addicts are scarce, but the framework established by the negligent hir-
ing case law supports the notion that an employer who hired an appli-
cant with knowledge of past alcohol or drug test failures would be
liable to third parties in the event that the driver has an alcohol or
drug related accident. For instance, in Gonzales v. City Wide Insula-
tion, Inc.,488 an off-duty employee in possession of a company truck
stopped at a tavern and consumed a large quantity of alcoholic bever-
ages.489 The employee then drove the company truck from the tavern
and shortly thereafter collided with another vehicle, killing two
women.490 The company moved for summary judgment on the negli-
gent hiring and negligent entrustment counts, arguing the company
did not know, nor should it have known, of the employee's alcohol-
ism.491 The court rejected the motion, holding that a jury could find
that the employer's failure to inquire about the employee's alcoholism
constituted negligence.492 If failing to inquire about an employee's al-
coholism or drug addiction constitutes negligent hiring, then con-
ducting the inquiry and finding evidence of an alcohol or drug
problem, but hiring the applicant anyway most certainly constitutes
negligent hiring.
Existing case law is not very supportive of recognizing increased
exposure to tort liability as a defense to a charge of employment dis-
crimination. In Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc. ,493 the Ninth Circuit dis-
cussed whether increased exposure to tort liability was an undue
hardship in the Title VII context.494 The plaintiff was denied a posi-
tion as a truck driver when he admitted that, as a member of the Na-
tive American Church, his religious practices involved the occasional
consumption of peyote.495 The plaintiff brought suit under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act challenging the defendant's policy of denying
employment to current drug users as a discriminatory employment
487. Id. at 1089.
488. No. 88-C-1299, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6360 (N.D. Il. May 25, 1990).
489. Id. at *2.
490. Id.
491. Id. at *3.
492. Id. at *9.
493. 892 F.2d 1481 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 948 (1990).
494. Id. at 1489-92.
495. Id. at 1484.
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practice based on religion.4 96 The plaintiff acknowledged the em-
ployer's concerns, but argued that the peyote use was infrequent, oc-
curred only while off-duty and in conjunction with a religious
ceremony, and that allowing him 24 hours off from duty when he did
use peyote was a reasonable accommodation sufficiently mitigating
the safety concern. 497 The court held that the increased liability in
hiring the plaintiff was too remote and speculative to create an undue
hardship.498
A year later, the Supreme Court in International Union v. Johnson
Controls, Inc.,499 discussed how tort liability interacts with Title VII
compliance.500 Johnson Controls involved a Title VII challenge to an
employment policy restricting fertile women, but not fertile men, from
jobs involving lead exposure.50 The Court rejected the employer's
bonafide occupational qualification (BFOQ) argument,50 2 because the
policy was unrelated to a woman's ability to perform the work.50 3
Though the issue was not directly raised by the employer, the Court
entertained the argument that avoiding increased exposure to tort lia-
bility to yet unborn persons may be a business necessity.50 4 The ma-
jority felt that as long as the employer complied with OSHA
regulations, fully informed women of the risk, and was not otherwise
negligent, the risk of tort liability was remote at best and not a justifi-
cation for discriminatory employment practices.50 5 Further, the ma-
jority seemed to imply federal pre-emption when it stated that state
tort law impedes the will of Congress to the extent it furthers discrimi-
nation against protected classes.506
A concurring opinion by Justice White, in which Justices Rehnquist
and Kennedy joined, was more sympathetic to the employer's di-
lemma.50 7 Justice White first noted that it was far from clear whether
Title VII pre-empted state tort law.50 8 Justice White then observed
that warnings to mothers would not insulate the employer from liabil-
496. Id. at 1483.
497. Id.
498. Id. at 1492.
499. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
500. Id. at 208-11.
501. Id. at 190.
502. Id. at 206.
503. Id.
504. Id. at 208-11.
505. Id.
506. Id. at 210.
507. Id. at 211 (White, J., concurring).
508. Id. at 213.
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ity to their unborn children. 509 Further, Justice White instructed that
compliance with OSHA regulations has never been a defense to negli-
gence.510 Justice Scalia's concurring opinion stated that substantially
increased exposure to state tort law liability would be a business ne-
cessity, but that Johnson Controls failed to establish that its exposure
was substantially increased by hiring fertile women. 511
3. Conclusion: Both Defenses Require the Showing of a High
Probability of Harm - With Safety-Sensitive Positions, this
High Standard Unnecessarily Places the Public at
Increased Risk
While the issue is unsettled, it appears that a business necessity de-
fense based on increased exposure to tort liability would fail unless
the increased exposure was substantial. 512 Therefore, employers are
essentially in the same position here as they are with the direct threat
standard. Increased exposure to tort liability is a business necessity
only if there is a high probability of harm, which in turn substantially
increases tort liability exposure. But if employers can establish that
exposure to tort liability is substantially increased, then they can also
meet the direct threat standard.
Requiring that transportation employers or other employers in-
volved in hazardous activities establish a high probability of harm
before safety concerns can justify denying employment to a disabled
individual is contrary to public policy when the threat is to the safety
of others. It would be unconscionable to ask the public to bear an
increased risk somewhere between "increased risk of harm" and "high
probability of harm." Between these two standards, the potential for
disaster is very real.
Since both employer defenses bisect at the point of having to show
a high probability of harm, a solution to the employer's dilemma lies
in modification of only one of the defenses. Looking towards modifi-
cation of the direct threat standard to mitigate the employer's di-
lemma has the advantage of side-stepping the murky waters
surrounding federal pre-emption of state tort law, while accomplishing
the same result. As the path of least resistance, this is the course the
509. Id.
510. Id. at 214.
511. Id. at 223-24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
512. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 210 (stating that argument in support of a substantial
increase in tort liability was premature in absence of substantial evidence); Toledo v. Nobel-
Sysco, Inc., 892 F.2d 1481, 1492 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 948 (1990) (finding a
speculative risk of tort liability insufficient to justify discriminatory practices).
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Comment chooses. Therefore, the Comment proposes that Congress
modify the direct threat standard as part of their current efforts to
enact legislative reform.
D. Proposed Solution: Congress Should Implement A Modest
Modification of the Direct Threat Standard
Congress imposed the direct threat standard because of concern
that employers were overly paternalistic in worrying that disabled em-
ployees would hurt themselves.513 Further, Congress recognized that
fears of increased safety risks were often based on stereotypic and
patronizing notions of the capabilities of the disabled.514 These con-
cerns are very real and justified. When considering only safety to
themselves, the disabled are in a better position to determine the risk
they wish to incur.515 However, when others must bear the increased
risk, as in the context of transportation, the direct threat standard goes
beyond what is required to meet the anti-discrimination concerns of
the disabled and imposes increased risks the public does not know-
ingly accept.
When imposing the direct threat standard, Congress may have felt
that employers' compliance with USDOT physical qualifications
would eliminate disabled persons posing an increased risk less severe
than a direct threat from employment in safety-sensitive functions. 516
However, alcoholics and rehabilitated drug addicts may meet the
FHWA's physical qualifications and yet be disabled under the
ADA.51 7 Given the potential for and unpredictability of relapse,518
513. See H.R. REP. No. 485 supra note 2, at 56, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 338 (requir-
ing employers to review possible accommodation without patronizing attitudes); S. REP. No.
116, supra note 3, at 39-40 (warning that paternalistic concerns for disabled individuals shall not
be used to disqualify otherwise qualified applicants).
514. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 3, at 39-40.
515. Id.
516. For example, FHWA safety regulations prohibit from operating in interstate commerce
drivers who have 1) a loss of foot, leg, hand, or arm; 2) an impairment which interferes with
prehension or power grasping, or an arm, foot, or leg impairment which interferes with perform-
ing the normal tasks associated with operating a motor vehicle; 3) insulin-dependent diabetics; 4)
heart disease and high blood pressure; 5) respiratory dysfunction which interferes with the abil-
ity to safely operate a motor vehicle; rheumatic, arthritic, orthopedic, muscular, neuromuscular,
or vascular disease; 6) epilepsy or other illness leading to a loss of consciousness; 7) mental,
nervous, or psychiatric disorder likely to affect the safe operation of a motor vehicle; vision not
correctable to 20/40; 8) hearing beneath a certain standard; 9) current drug abuse; 10) a current
clinical diagnosis of alcoholism. 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(1) - (13).
517. For example, the ADA protects individuals with records of disabilities who may not cur-
rently have a disqualifying condition under FHWA rules, but who are prone to suffer relapse
without notice because of the nature of their disability. See supra text accompanying notes 41-65
(discussing who may qualify as disabled under the ADA).
[Vol. 45:537
INTERACTION OF ADA AND OTETA
employing persons who within the last two years have failed an
OTETA-required alcohol or drug test carries with it an increased risk.
When the risk involves the safety and well being of others, employers
should be empowered, not handcuffed, to mitigate the risk.
Both congressional concern for paternalistic treatment of the dis-
abled by employers and protection of the traveling public could be
achieved through a modified direct threat standard. This standard
would allow an employer to deny employment to persons posing only
an increased risk to safety, if the risk is to others; and, if the essential
job functions require public contact while engaged in safety-sensitive
functions. The direct threat standard as currently enacted would still
need to be met for direct threats to the safety of the disabled person
alone, and for non safety-sensitive positions.
Under the modified direct threat standard, there must still be an
individual assessment and a genuine increase in the risk to safety.
Therefore, unsubstantiated fears would be insufficient to eliminate the
disabled from the full range of employment opportunities. However,
by eliminating the high probability of harm requirement, the public is
better protected. The increased risk must be to others, not the em-
ployee alone. Therefore, employers may not act paternalisticly to-
ward the disabled, and must continue to recognize that the disabled
are best able to assess for themselves the risk they choose to incur.
Finally, the modified direct threat standard applies only where an em-
ployee's essential job function requires contact with others while per-
forming safety-sensitive functions. This requirement ensures that the
modification does not swallow the rule. Safety-sensitive functions in
the transportation context are defined in OTETA.519 Other safety-
sensitive functions could include driving an automobile, operating ma-
chinery, certain construction work, etc. The rule would apply only if
the safety-sensitive functions are performed while interacting with
others.
CONCLUSION
The aims of both the ADA and OTETA are certainly essential for
any modem industrialized nation. Maintaining economic prosperity
requires that all citizens be given opportunities to contribute to the
fullest extent of their capabilities. Likewise, the movement of goods
and people along a safe and efficient transportation system is vital to a
518. See Nathan, supra note 456, at 684 (arguing that treatment success rates are so discourag-
ing that focus has shifted from treatment to prevention).
519. Safety-sensitive functions are those on-duty functions set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 395.2 (1)-
(7). 49 C.F.R. § 382.107.
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nation's economic health. In the zeal to achieve these goals, Congress
has unfortunately enacted two statutory schemes that fail to mesh
with perfect synchrony. The two modest proposals put forth in this
Comment would go far in resolving conflict between the two statutes
while continuing to further the congressional goals of both. The first
proposal calls for reconsideration of the EEOC's holding that breath
alcohol tests are medical examinations subject to the ADA's confiden-
tiality requirements. If the EEOC would simply provide alcohol tests
the same exception from the ADA's confidentiality requirements as it
provides drug tests, a direct conflict between the ADA and OTETA
disappears. The second proposal calls for Congress to modify the
ADA's direct threat standard. This modification will facilitate the
achievement of Congress's goal of an alcohol- and drug-free transpor-
tation system while causing an inconsequential loss of employment
rights for the disabled. Providing employers with a less conflicted reg-
ulatory scheme and the public with improved transportation safety are
two concerns which merit immediate consideration of these two mod-
est proposals.
David L. LaPorte
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